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IS SLAVERY A BLESSING?

A R E P L Y

TO

Prof. Bledsoe's Essay on Liberty and Slavery:

WITH REMARKS ON SLAVERY AS IT IS.

BY A CITIZEN OF THE SOUTH.

*Prof. Chas B. Shaw,
Richmond, Va.*

C.

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P R E F A C E .

✓ THE fanaticism which controls party strife frequently renders men unwilling or incapable of arguing more than one side of a disputed question. The rival factions of York and Lancaster regarded more earnestly the colors which became the badges of party, than the original cause of separation.

“If a man,” says Locke, “can be persuaded and be assured of any thing for a truth, without having examined, what is there he may not embrace for truth?”

Permit a reasoner to make his own premises, and he will prove any thing — as Archimedes could have moved the world, had a fulcrum been possible for the effort.

The Slavery Issue has unhappily been discussed of late in this manner. The advocates of that institution could not be more zealous in its vindication if it had been an undisputed feature in the Declaration of Independence, or in Magna Charta itself. A universal conviction that it was a great national blessing, part of the alleged indefeasible rights of the human family, could not possibly produce more earnest and persistent efforts for its perpetuity and extension than is now manifested by Southern States. Was it always thus? On the contrary, did not the most virtuous and enlightened Southern statesmen, both by precept and example, deplore and discourage slavery. Philanthropists, South and North, who witnessed with regret the growth of a weed so noxious in Freedom's harvest, looked longingly to the time when the good seed should be separated, and regeminate disencumbered of the exotic bane. With the advance of time slavery in the Northern States was abandoned. Its very nature — at least that of American slavery, which was always of a mild type — had been there forgotten; and bad as we still admit it to be, its features were rendered still more atrocious by the ignorance which had invested it with all the abstract horrors of the slavery of romance. It was quite natural that efforts should be made to secure some disclaimer, at least, of this evil, as a national institution. The debates to which such attempts

gave rise, have been continued to the present time. An ingenious Southern statesman, who had figured conspicuously on both sides of all the political questions of his day, brought to light a new and original "truth," which had escaped the wisdom and patriotic research of all preceding moralists — that "the true basis of a nation's greatness and happiness is — not Freedom, but Slavery!" To this fortunate scape-valve all Southern steam has subsequently rushed. The only wonder was that a proposition so evident had been so long undiscovered. By its aid the dismayed South, who under the pressure of public sentiment, and the guidance of old-fashioned notions of justice and philanthropy, had almost unanimously begun to legislate in favor of emancipation, have been enabled to take the offensive. Her secular press and her religious press now argue the new dogma, that "slavery is a blessing, both to the slave and the free;" and with the most catholic humanity, would not only perpetuate so great a good, but would cram the wholesome but rather nauseous medicine down the unwilling throats of freemen in the new States.

Calhoun and McDuffie were the first champions in this new contest. Prof. Dew made a labored defence of slavery. Between his time and the present, a "fusillade" of pro-slavery arguments has peppered the press from county court lawyers and embryo politicians, with an occasional discharge from bigger artillery, such as Fitzhugh and Stringfellow. The Paixhan gun of the whole battery is understood to be Prof. Bledsoe's "Liberty and Slavery." This is intended as a final and conclusive response to Wayland and Channing, and their less discreet allies who contend for "immediate abolition."

In this inky contest, each section seems to read the arguments of its own advocates and no other. Fitzhugh and Bledsoe are denied a perusal in the North, as are Wayland and Channing in the South.

The question, nevertheless, has a right and a wrong side. If truth has not been utterly prostrated and overwhelmed in the mire of controversy, she must have votaries in both the North and South, who are willing to hear an argument which is not, like an advocate's plea, wholly on one side.

It may diminish any interest felt in this book that it is not backed by the authority of a great name. We incline to the opinion that great names alone could have produced the present sophistical state of mind in a very large portion of the Southern public on this momentous issue.

We leave our own position, if it shall be thought to have any bearing on the question, to be discovered from the mode in which our theme is

handled. Our opinions, it will be found, are decided, though they do not agree wholly with either of the excited factions. We do not court the favor or fear the resentment of either. We expect no literary laurels, and shall be more than rewarded if our effort should receive the attention of the reflecting, the conservative, and the patriotic.

Having been nearly thirty years a resident of the South, with the most ample opportunity to be acquainted with her institutions and character, it has been to us a matter of regret to see good people so far astray in estimating the causes of their own want of progress. We have therefore added to our Review of Dr. Bledsoe an Appendix illustrating the effects of slavery on Southern society. The latter we claim to know, in all its phases — not in an occasional visit, during which studious efforts might be made to propitiate our opinion, nor during a residence in a contiguous free State, where the horrors of slavery are always exaggerated. We have seen Southern society in the drawing room and the cabin, the town and country, the hall of legislation and the county court. We have seen it as a friend, and have no reason to exaggerate or extenuate in speaking of it. For our concluding parallel of Southern and Northern character, we do not expect less than the censure of the bigotted in both quarters.

We send forth our little bark of discovery amid the reefs and quicksands of the political ocean ; hoping that by the use of the *sounding lead*, and the skill of abler pilots who may be induced to venture, some channel may yet be discovered to conduct us into the harbor of *peace* and *safety*.

MAY, 1857.

INTRODUCTION.

THE publication of a book like Dr. Bledsoe's "LIBERTY AND SLAVERY," written evidently in support of the heresy in ethics, that Slavery is a blessing to a community, and having a tendency to perpetuate slavery, is in our mind such evidence of unhealthy public sentiment, that we feel compelled to express our dissent. We cannot be guilty of the baseness of silence. With our old friend Juvenal, we may say,

*"Quid Romæ faciam : mentiri nescio : librum,
Si malus est, nequeo laudare et poscere."*

Arguments for slavery, based on the present inferiority of slaves cannot be admitted, until it is shown that they have reached the perfection of their intellectual and moral nature, in spite of efforts made and making for its improvement. Six and twenty years ago, several of the Southern States were discussing, in public and private, plans for the gradual emancipation of slaves — some means by which they could be elevated from their debased condition, midway between savage and civilized man, and be made partakers of human progress.

That beneficent work was arrested by a complication of causes — among them the well-meant but too zealous movements of friends of the measure in the free States. It cannot be right, however, to abandon any proper reformation because indiscreet meddlers would dictate its mode and measure. Humane and moderate persons in the South are still impressed with the great evils of slavery; but they dare not now express their sentiments, and in the next generation the Calhoun dogma will, if uncontroverted now, be religiously believed.

We are unwilling to suppose that — whilst under the guidance of Providence, invention for multiplying the physical conveniences of the human race seems almost exhaustless; whilst all the arts of civilized life are daily adding to the resources of human comfort; and whilst Bible, Missionary, and Temperance Societies are making such inroads into the dominions of vice and misery — amidst all this evidence of progress to-

ward millennial perfection—it is the Creator's will to *perpetuate* the subjugation of man to man by means of the moral inferiority of one race to another.

It should be inquired, whether laws for the elevation of the inferior race could not be enacted without danger to private and public safety; or whether, admitting that danger, humanity does not require that it should be encountered. Will the South be convicted of refusing to admit the most moderate dissent from their views? Dare they not examine any suggestions of error in the arguments with which they are now pressed by the champions of slavery?

Dr. Bledsoe has shown that slavery might be proper in the infant stages of society, and that in one instance it was ordained of Providence. He has not demonstrated that it is at all in accordance with the spirit of an age like the present—an age of universal enlightenment and progress.

Having shown that American slaves are morally superior to the native African, and that they are not now, intellectually or morally, fit for self-government, he admits that but little is done to advance their condition, and his whole argument is for its perpetuity. His views against giving slaves the Bible are wrong, we think, both in policy and religious ethics.

The argument drawn from the want of success in the Emancipation of the British Colonies, bears only on the question of immediate abolition.

We ourselves believe that before slavery can be entirely abolished, slaves must not only be prepared for the duties of freemen, but that in the prospect of that event, our own race must be taught the virtues of industry and self-reliance. The premature abolition of slavery would find both races equally unprepared for the event. “The white race,” as the *North American Review* once observed, “are as much fettered to one end of the chain as the slave to the other.” This is conspicuous from Bigelow's *Notes on the British Colonies*. If lands of the greatest fertility can, as he says, be purchased for little or nothing in Jamaica, whose soil can produce all the necessaries and most of the luxuries of life, how does it happen that the white residents are on the point of starving? Is it not because, through the influence of hereditary idleness, they have not learned to work? The reply that “white men cannot labor in tropical climates,” would seem to prove that nature did not design they should dwell there. That they can, however, sustain the toils of a tropical sun, is shown by the hardy constitutions of Mexican whites, and of the herdsmen of the Brazilian “llanos,” under the very equator.

If only blacks could endure the severities of the tropics, it appears to us a singular species of ethics which would justify a tyrant race—itsself

incapable of such endurance — in subjugating the black race, spurring them to toils unbefitting the climate, while the whole product of those toils should enure to their lords ; a state of society in which all the advantages and luxuries should be enjoyed by one race, and all the hardships endured by the other. It is no apology that they are *demi-Christianized*, or *half civilized*. If that be the chief end in their condition, the work should be *completed*. It must otherwise be pronounced a *subterfuge*.

We shall investigate Dr. Bledsoe's several propositions "*seriatim*," with what candor our readers must judge.

REPLY TO BLEDSOE.

CHAPTER I.

DR. BLEDSOE'S book opens with an inquiry into the nature of Civil Liberty. As he writes, if not professedly, still evidently with the purpose of upholding slavery, he seems conscious of treading on slippery ground.

The harmony which distinguishes the writings of Locke, Blackstone, Paley, Mackintosh and Macaulay, in their disquisitions on the same subject—and the view in which they all unite of the primitive constitution of society—present such a barrier of truth and common sense against the introduction of Dr. Bledsoe's peculiar views, that he is obliged to reject the authority and oppugn the wisdom of those great men, and institute an hypothesis of his own.

He regrets—deeply regrets, “that the doctrine of human liberty has been discussed with so little care, with so little moral earnestness, with so little real energetic longing and searching after truth.”

He deploras, in the next sentence, the fact that this investigation, though requiring the coolest and most discriminating exercise of mental power, should yet have been, “for the most part, a theme for passionate declamation rather than of severe analysis or of protracted and patient investigation.”

Such an exordium would induce the reader to expect only the coolest logic; yet it is followed by some very pretty declamation on the part of the Professor himself—as this:

"How often from the altars of this *unknown* idol has the blood of human victims streamed! Even here, in this glorious land of ours, how often do the *too religious* Americans seem to become deaf to the most appalling lessons of the past, while engaged in the frantic worship of this their tutelar deity! At this very moment, the highly favored land in which we live is convulsed from its centre to its circumference by the agitations of these pious devotees of freedom; and how long ere scenes which called forth the celebrated exclamation of Madame Roland—'O Liberty, what crimes are perpetrated in thy name!'—may be enacted among us, it is not possible for human sagacity or foresight to determine."

"If no one would talk of liberty," he next complacently informs us, "but those who had taken pains to understand it, there would a perfect calm be restored, and peace once more visit a happy people."

Let the reader then sit down with us at the knees of this oracular professor, this honest and energetic searcher after truth, and listen to the teachings of his lips.

"§ I. *The commonly received Definition of Civil Liberty.*

"'Civil liberty,' says Blackstone, 'is no other than natural liberty so far restrained as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage.' This definition seems to have been borrowed from Locke, who says that, when a man enters into civil society, 'he is to part with so much of his *natural liberty*, in providing for himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety of the society may require.' So likewise say Paley, Burlamaqui, Rutherford, and a host of others. Indeed, among jurists and philosophers, such seems to be the commonly-received definition of civil liberty. It seems to have become a political maxim that civil liberty is no other than a certain portion of our natural liberty, which has been carried therefrom, and secured to us by the protection of the laws.

"But is this a sound maxim? Has it been deduced from the

nature of things, or is it merely a plausible show of words? Is it truth—solid and imperishable truth—or merely one of those fair resemblances of truth, which, through the too hasty sanction of great names, have obtained a currency among men? The question is not what Blackstone or Locke or Paley may have thought; but what is truth? Let us examine this point, then, in order that our decision may be founded, not upon the authority of man, but, if possible, on the wisdom of God.”

The writer proceeds:

“§ II. *Examination of the commonly received Definition of Civil Society.*

“Before we can determine whether such be the origin of civil liberty, we must first ascertain the character of that natural liberty out of which it is supposed to be reserved. What then is natural liberty? What is the nature of the material out of which our civil liberty is supposed to be fashioned by the art of the political sculptor? It is thus defined by Locke: ‘To understand political power right, and derive it from its original, we must consider what state all men are naturally in; and that is a state of perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit, *within the bounds of the law of nature*, without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man.’

“In perfect accordance with this definition, Blackstone says: ‘This natural liberty consists in the power of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control, unless by the laws of nature, being a right inherent in us by birth, and one of the gifts of God to man at his creation, when he endowed him with the faculty of free will.’

“Such, according to Locke and Blackstone, is that natural liberty, which is limited and abridged, as they suppose, when we enter into the bonds of society. Now mark its features; it is the gift of God to man at his creation; the very top and flower of his existence; that by which he is distinguished from the lower animals and raised to the rank of moral and accountable

beings. Shall we abridge and mutilate the image of God stamped on the soul at its creation, by which we are capable of knowing and obeying his law, in order to secure the aid and protection of man? Shall we barter away any portion of this our glorious birthright, for any poor boon of man's devising? Yes! we are told—and why? 'Because,' says Blackstone, 'legal obedience and conformity is infinitely more valuable than the *wild and savage liberty* which is sacrificed to obtain it.'

"But how is this? *Now* this natural liberty is a thing of light, and *now* it is a power of darkness. Now it is the gift of God, that moves within a sphere of light, and breathes an atmosphere of love; and anon, it is a wild and savage thing that carries terror in its train. It would be an angel of light, if it were not a power of darkness; and it would be a power of darkness, if it were not an angel of light. But as it is, it is both by turns, and neither long, but runs through its Protean changes according to the exigencies of the flowing discourse of the learned author.

"Surely, such inconsistency, so glaring and so portentous, and all exhibited on one and the same page, is no evidence that the genius of the great commentator was as profound as it was elegant and classical."

Now, kind reader! is all knowledge—all truthful ratiocination—pent within the walls of universities? Do we inhabit an outside fog of ignorance and stupidity—an incapability of seeing truth in any other aspect than the one in which it shall suit the pleasure, or the interest, of so kind a gentleman as Dr. Bledsoe to exhibit it to our obfuscate vision?

We really pity the manes of Sir William Blackstone. We would propose to Judge Edmonds or some of his disciples to evoke the spirit of the great jurist, and propound the question, "how he relishes a castigation of such *evident* propriety—such deserved and unmeasured severity." Will he not be found to hang his head, and whimper like a whipped urchin at Eton or Rugby?

Encouraged, however, by Dr. Bledsoe's longing after truth, and his contempt of mere authority—which must be our apology

for doubting so great an authority as himself—we will venture to take another peep at this syllogism.

Does Blackstone say anything about *powers of darkness*, or *things of terror*—about atmospheres of love, or *angels of light*? or are they the coinage of Dr. Bledsoe's imagination—mere rhetorical nine-pins, which he has set up himself to show the world how well he can bowl?

We venture this little pebble at the head of the giant who breakfasts on Locke, Blackstone and Paley. Under the guidance of truth, it may hit him in the forehead. Blackstone's proposition is as plain and unadorned with fancy, as might be one of the Professor's own problems in mathematics; it is the latter who indulges in the elegant and classical.

Blackstone calls natural liberty "*wild and savage*," it is true. Does Dr. Bledsoe hold that everything wild and savage must necessarily be noxious, and cannot be converted to good and profitable uses? It cannot with certainty be assumed that Blackstone used the word "*savage*," (*saurage*,) in any other sense than as an amplification of the word "*wild*."

Wild horses, elephants, and other brutes are tamed and trained to be the docile servants of man. Wheat, the staff of life, is the product of agricultural patience and skill; in its natural state, but an ordinary grass. From the rough almond comes the luscious peach, and from a little thread-like root, that noble esculent the potato—cauliflower and broccoli from colewort—plums from sloes. Gardeners give a long list of products purely factitious, which man by study and experiment has reclaimed from the wild originals.

With intelligence but by divine beneficence he has subdued the fire and the flood, he has prisoned the fearful elements, and compels their toil for his uses. The sun is now man's limner, and the very lightnings are his couriers.

God gave man a paradise to *dress*; he gave him a mind to cultivate.

Though God gave man liberty, and made him ruler of inferior orders, it must be remembered that he lost a portion of the Divine image in his "*fall*." Hence the formations of societies

and laws are not *abridgements* or *mutilations*, as Dr. Bledsoe pleases to suppose them to be, but efforts for the restoration of man's original perfection.

We came into existence naked and defenceless. By the exercise of reason, we learn to protect our tender bodies from inclement elements, or from savage violence. Change is not necessarily mutilation or abridgement. Progress, in morals as well as in physics, is a law in man's nature.

God's word and human institutions have raised man in the moral scale. This law of progress pervades the world; it has done so from the first dawns of society. It will do so while the world endures; and woe to the sophist who shall attempt to arrest the march of light, freedom and happiness.

Perhaps, gentle reader! you begin now to suspect, with us, that all this alleged awe and reverence for truth, in one who tries to establish a position by distortions of that of his adversary, and absurd additions to it of his own, ought not to be allowed much weight in the consideration of his argument.

Dr. Bledsoe goes on to say:

"Blackstone has thus lost sight of truth, not only in regard to his general propositions, but in regard to particular instances. 'The law,' says he, 'which restrains a man from doing mischief to his fellow citizens, diminishes the natural liberty of mankind.' 'Now,' says Dr. Bledsoe, 'is this true? The doing of mischief is contrary to the law of nature, and hence, according to the definition of Blackstone himself, the perpetration of it is not an exercise of any natural right. As no man possesses a natural right to do mischief, so the law which forbids it does not diminish the natural liberty of mankind. The law which forbids mischief is a restraint not upon the *natural liberty* but upon the *natural tyranny* of man."

Here the writer confounds the terms "right" and "liberty." Blackstone does not define the doing of anything, good, or evil, as the consequence of a *natural right*, but of a *natural liberty*, where God "endowed him with the faculty of free will." (See Dr. Bledsoe's quotation of Blackstone, p. 14.) Adam had the *liberty* to eat the forbidden apple, but not the *right*. Hence he

had the power to do mischief, which is so far from being contrary to the law of nature, that it is sadly the reverse, the law in our members always inclining us to evil. Dr. Bledsoe himself contends, in his "Theodicy," that though our perceptive faculties may be passive, our volitions are our own; and that the stretching forth of one's hand to take an apple is an act of absolute free will. So strenuous an assertor of free will can scarcely contend that man is in bondage to sin, and that the truth alone can make him free. His theory of society is here opposed to the doctrines of his Theodicy.

We shall continue to think, with Locke, Blackstone, Paley and Robert Hall, that man *does* surrender a portion of his liberty when he enters the social state, Dr. Bledsoe's philosophy notwithstanding.

At the beginning of page 20, in discussing those writers, he identifies natural freedom with the power to act as God wills, and not in conformity with our own sovereign will and pleasure, here, as elsewhere, confounding "liberty" and "right."

Society is, we think, an institution of Providence, by which men are induced to relinquish a portion of their liberty to do good or evil, for the attainment of some greater advantage. All primitive associations were in some degree voluntary, though they have become compulsory, in the progress of population, to such a degree, indeed, that our imagination and our inductive faculties alone can discover what degree of liberty the natural man possessed.

In chap. I., sect. 3, it is asserted that "no good law abridges the natural liberty of mankind."

Here is the same confusion of terms. Substitute the word "right" for the word "liberty," and Dr. Bledsoe's reasoning becomes intelligible.

If man's free will is as absolute as Dr. Bledsoe contends, and God gave him freedom to choose between good and evil, then, according to Dr. Bledsoe, the law which abridged this liberty, and said "thou shalt not eat," was not a good law, though given by God himself.

In the same section he contends, in opposition to Locke and

Burke, that the natural right of self-defence is not abridged by the laws of society. Another fallacy. It is abridged, but not annulled, and his logic shows no more. Dr. Bledsoe contends, also, that the laws of society enlarge the right of self-defence beyond that possessed in a state of nature. An offender, he reasons, must be punished on one of two grounds; "either on the ground that he deserves punishment, or that his punishment is necessary to prevent similar offences. Now upon either of these grounds, has any man, in a state of nature, the right to punish an offence committed against himself?" "No man," he contends, "has or ever had the right to wield the awful attribute of justice." "This is the prerogative of God alone."

Let us examine into this. In a state of nature, absolute, man's rights and freedom of action, at first, do not conflict. As the land becomes full, jostlings of interests occur, and wrongs are perpetrated.

In the absence of that machinery called society, is the solitary dweller to inflict no punishment on the roaming savage who has fired his house and attempts the murder of his children? Dr. Bledsoe admits that right, *flagrante delicto*, but plainly denies it as a measure of justice for an offence already perpetrated. He must fold his arms, and call on God's thunder to strike the offender. No other aid could be invoked. A little plain reasoning would perhaps conclude, that the undisputed natural right of self-defence might include as much of vindictive punishment as was necessary to prevent a recurrence of the crime. If that crime deserved even death, and the injured party—acting from the last severe necessity, in the double character of judge and executioner, proceeded to inflict it, will it be supposed that the great *arbiter injuriarum* would not ratify the sentence, because no human magistrate had yet been appointed to wield the scales and sword of justice. Dr. Bledsoe, perhaps, would say that the best apology for his conduct would be his never having read his own ethics, or breathed the air of the University of Virginia.

As God gave the natural man a conscience — though some sophists deny even that — he would be, in some degree, a judge of right and wrong; and if, in the defence of his natural rights,

he should proceed beyond the bounds of equity, God would not hold him guiltless.

In the increase of population, it would no longer be possible at all times for each individual to do that which of itself was right. Conflicts of right would not always be decided according to men's consciences; associations would be formed for the protection of the weak against the strong. Some code of laws would be enacted or understood by consent, and some individual would be selected to administer them. The primary type of such an association is the Family. The authority of the father, obeyed at first from necessity, would afterwards be deferred to from affection, from reverence for his experience, or from habit. The longevity of the patriarchs made them, first, fathers of families, and next, chiefs of tribes. A common interest in all their descendants gave, no doubt, occasion for more than ordinary care and equity in adjudicating quarrels.

On the demise of the early patriarchs, there sprung up new chiefs and tribes, who were only collaterally related. Successive sub-divisions produced more numerous tribes; the ties of blood were lost, and those of proximity and community of interest alone felt.

Geographical position would again modify these last bonds, and distinct nationalities arose.

In another place we shall advance our views, as derived from history and reason, of the rise of the institution of slavery. At present, *revenons a nos moutons* — let us resume Dr. Bledsoe.

Sect. IV. defines *The distinction between rights and liberty*. "In the foregoing discussion," the writer informs us, "we have, in conformity to custom, used the terms '*rights*' and '*liberty*,' as words precisely of the same import. But instead of being convertible terms, there seems to be a very clear difference in their signification." It seems not to have suited Dr. Bledsoe to draw this distinction sooner, as on the convertibility of the terms depends all the reasoning of Sect. III. In Sect. IV. he goes on to say, "If a man be taken, for example, and without cause thrown into prison, this deprives him of his *liberty*, but not of his *right*, to go where he pleases. The right still exists; and

his not being allowed to enjoy this right, is precisely what constitutes the oppression in the case supposed. If there were no right still subsisting, there would be no oppression. Hence, as the *right* exists, while the *liberty* is extinguished, it is evident they are distinct from each other. The liberty of a man, in such a case, as in all others, would consist in an opportunity to enjoy his right, or in a state in which it might be enjoyed if he so pleased."

This, at least, is good reasoning. We may refer to this passage in the progress of our argument.

"God gave our rights," says Dr. Bledsoe, "and all the powers of earth combined cannot take them away. But for our liberty, this we freely own is, for the most part, due to the sacred bonds of civil society." Here, again, is the same confusion of terms — the protection of our rights by the State being made synonymous with liberty; whereas that protection is the barter of a part of that very liberty for a greater good.

Dr. Bledsoe seems to consider all government as a sort of theocracy, dropped upon mankind, in every instance, like the promulgation of the decalogue from Sinai, and never instituted by the consent of the governed, or by the force or fraud of ambitious men. This argument may be grounded by him, possibly, on the Scripture, "The powers that be are ordained of God." Our explanation of this is, however, that God, being the great ruler of the universe, permits every government, as long as it subserves his purposes. We are not inclined to attribute all the bad governments which have disfigured the pages of history to more than the divine permission. In ways not known to us, God makes the wrath of man to praise Him. God for a long time permitted Egyptian bondage. Will it be contended that he approved the oppressions of the Egyptian task-masters?

Sect. V. discusses *The relation between the state of nature and of civil society*.

"Civil society," says the writer, "does not abridge our natural rights, but secures and protects them. She does not assume our right of self-defence. She simply discharges the duty imposed by God to defend us. The original right is in the body politic, and not in the individual."

Where, we would ask, was the original right before this body politic existed? And what proof does history afford that governments were only instituted to secure the rights of the natural man?

Individuals, indeed, might associate with that object; but most of the governments of the ancient world were the fruits of self-seeking ambition, which scrupled not to oppress — often under the name of justice, and the pretended sanction of the gods. Such governments respected neither the rights nor liberties of mankind; though, according to Dr. Bledsoe, they are established for no other purposes. Possibly he means some such abstraction as a *perfect government*, which might be of divine institution. One abstraction might thus be well opposed by another; and the logic, which he subsequently (and with some success, it must be confessed) employs in combatting the views of Wayland and Channing be successfully repelled. This we shall show in the proper place.

The writer condemns the view of Locke, which defines the state of nature to be one of "perfect freedom."

"The enjoyment of it is very uncertain, however," says Locke, "and exposed to the invasion of others." "This makes him willing to quit a condition which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers; and it is not without reason that he seeks out, and is willing to join in society, with others who are already united or have a mind to unite, for the mutual protection of their lives, liberties, and estates, which I call by the general name of *property*."

"What!" says Dr. Bledsoe, "can that be a state of perfect freedom which is subject to fears and perpetual dangers? Can a reign of terror be a reign of liberty? It is evident, we think, that Locke has been betrayed into no little inaccuracy and confusion of thought, from not having distinguished between rights and liberty."

Possibly, if Mr. Locke had anticipated the scrutiny of such an adept in verbal disputations, he might have amended his position somewhat in this manner: Man's natural state is that of the family. Each *pater-familias* regards as much of physical nature

as lies within his grasp as subject to his will, and convertible to his use. He feels as strong a conviction of his magisterial authority over the members of his family. His sphere of action is at first undisputed, and may be indefinitely extended without obstruction, as spreads a circle on a smooth expanse of water from the dropping into it of one pebble. A shower of pebbles will produce as many small circles whose peripheries are limited by the general resultant of them all.

Consanguinity, in the primitive ages, was so diluted in the emigration of successive tribes seeking new lands, that men forgot that God made them originally out of one blood; and when the reaction of the tide of migration brought remote families or tribes into proximity, they would meet often as enemies. As men become straightened for room, and the family sphere seemed to be invaded—either by the force of conscience, or by force from without—each was made to acknowledge that he was by nature entitled to no more of her bounties than he could profitably use, without trenching, by his cupidity or waste, on the equal rights of others who were situated in all respects like himself.

The inconvenient proximity of families or tribes, is itself a sort of disorganized society. The strong would begin to oppress the weak. Alliance of families would be formed to repel aggression. As Providence assigned to men diversities of gifts, and the first wants of society are physical, leaders would naturally be chosen who could best secure the largest enjoyment of physical advantages—generally those who were distinguished for strength and prowess in the chase of savage beasts, or for military skill. Such individuals would naturally take the lead.

In these petty monarchies, justice would not always rule; hence men would lose a large portion of their liberties in the endeavor to secure their rights. On the very best construction of society, however, men's rights are curtailed of their natural limits, and become so many compromises for mutual good.

Our dissertation on the progress of society being limited to an examination *gradatim* of Dr. Bledsoe's views, we will here take occasion to say, that government seems, from the above hypothesis, to have been instituted, not to cure the evils of the

natural state, but those of the ill-regulated social state; not to confer liberty, but to repress licentiousness. Locke's view, in the broadest and most liberal sense, will, we think, be sustained.

Proceeding in the same systematic error, Dr. Bledsoe discourses, in section VI., on "*Inherent and inalienable rights.*"

Assuming his own constitution of society to be always right, he argues that men cannot transfer the right to life or liberty because they never possessed any more of either right than was conferred on them by the *jus divinum* of society. This is part and parcel of the same fallacy.

No inherent or inalienable *right* can empower any individual to do *wrong*. Hence an individual may not be considered guilty of the crime of suicide, who consents to the infliction on himself of the death penalty, if it be in pursuance of a preordained law adjudging that penalty for such an offence as in the state of nature or of primitive society would justify such a punishment. It is the *wrong doing* which has forfeited to society the life of the individual, and no lapse of the *right* of self-protection.

The voluntary consent of any individual to any law which for insufficient cause should jeopard his life, makes him *particeps criminis*.

Though life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are the natural endowments of all men, they are alienable to such a degree, we think, as the general good may absolutely require. Every man is, however, accountable to the Judge of all the earth, both for what he may unnecessarily abandon, and for what he may unnecessarily take from another, of those great trusts.

Dr. Bledsoe goes on in this section to say, "There are inalienable rights, we admit; but then such abstractions are the edge tools of political science, with which it is dangerous for either men or children to play. They may inflict deep wounds on the cause of humanity; they can throw no light on the great problem of slavery."

"Conscience and honor," Dr. Bledsoe elsewhere informs us, "are inalienable possessions." They are, indeed, edge tools, with which it is dangerous for men to play, but it can scarcely

be conceded that they can throw no light on the great problem of slavery.

Conscience and honor are not, however, inalienable possessions. Both may be basely abandoned to false teachings. They are intangible, however, if the possessor be but true to himself and true to God. No force from without can prevail against them, unless there be a traitor in the citadel.

“ The soul, secure in her existence, smiles
At the drawn dagger, and defies its point.”

At the end of this section is the following false conclusion : “ But we have already seen, and shall still more fully see, that the law which ordains slavery is not unjust in itself, or in other words, that it interferes with none of the inalienable rights of man.” A conclusion false, because based upon a false view of the constitution of society, and the source of liberty and human rights.

Section VIII. *Conclusion of the First Chapter.* This section takes up the glove against two other champions of the truth, as we hold it—Mackintosh and Macaulay. They maintain, in common with the host of worthies against whom he had already couched his reckless lance, that the science of government consists in finding such an adjustment of the antagonistic principles of public order and private liberty, that neither shall overthrow or subvert the other, but each be confined within its own appropriate limits.

Dr. Bledsoe contends that they are not *antagonistic*, but *coördinate*, always arguing from the same *false premises*, that *the individual derives his liberty from society*. We have no disposition to knock this monstrous creation in social ethics in the head oftener than there shall be absolute occasion. We shall let it alone, then, until we see further symptoms of revival.

As our object is to unveil error, without regard to the parties from whom it proceeds, we have nothing to say to the harmless declamation with which this sophism is accompanied, and the chapter concluded.

CHAPTER II.

The second chapter of Dr. Bledsoe's book — the arrangement of which we propose to follow — is headed thus :

• *The Arguments and Positions of Abolitionists.*

Dr. Bledsoe enumerates, in this chapter, almost as many arguments in defence of slavery, as the Duke of Brunswick gave reasons for being a Catholic. We do not read much, and have never read Wayland and Fuller's debate. We are, therefore, obliged to Dr. Bledsoe for such extracts as possess us of the ground of dispute. As we are ignorant of their arguments, we may be found, sometimes, in our notices of Dr. Bledsoe's book, inadvertently guilty of producing a stale thought; but we argue "on our own hook," mainly with the object of putting down sophistry, but always, we hope, with sufficient candor to admit any just conclusion of our adversary.

Dr. Wayland says: "I have wished to make it clear that slavery, or the holding men in bondage, and 'obliging them to labor for our benefit, without their contract or consent,' is always and everywhere, or, as you well express it, *semper et ubique*, a moral wrong, a violation of the obligations under which we are created to our fellow-men, and a transgression against our Creator."

Dr. Fuller likewise: "The simple question is, whether it necessarily, and amid all circumstances, is a crime to hold men in a condition where they labor for another, without their consent or contract. And in settling this question all impertinences must be retrenched."

Dr. Bledsoe seems to be in no particularly good humor with Dr. Wayland, for having published his letter on slavery under the signature of the AUTHOR OF THE MORAL SCIENCE. Naughty Dr. Wayland should have remembered that there might be other Moral Sciences than his own, and that essays on that subject might emanate from other universities than that with which he was connected.

We confess in the outset that Dr. Bledsoe's or Dr. Fuller's

logic (for we know not whose it is) is too strong for Dr. Wayland's position. They seem to have proved that slavery is not *semper et ubique* wrong; but have they established the position that American slavery is no violation of the rights of man — or that it *now*, and *as it exists here*, is right? We think they have not. We shall endeavor to sift good grain from chaff, in the examination, *seriatim*, of Dr. Bledsoe's "seventeen fallacies of the Abolitionists," giving him entire credit for all he proves, and correcting the arguments of the disputants on both sides, in accordance with the view we have ourselves adopted.

§ I. *The First Fallacy.*

Dr. Bledsoe complains with great reason that Abolitionists do not hold their passions in subjection. In this charge he sustains himself by the admissions of the ablest and yet most courteous among them. "They have done wrong, I believe," says Dr. Channing, "They have fallen into the common error of enthusiasts — that of exaggerating their object."

"The tone of Abolitionists at the North," says Dr. Wayland, "has been frequently — I fear I must say generally — fierce, bitter, and abusive."

As American citizens we grieve to acknowledge the truth of this opinion. We remember the period when dissent from the propriety of slaveholding was mingled with a rational commiseration of those on whom that institution had fallen as an inheritance. We also remember when this sentiment was not confined to the North — ay, when it was almost universal here in Virginia. We well remember the legislative debate of '30-'31, wherein there was little discrepancy of opinion as to the expediency of abolition. The debate had reference, chiefly, to the mode in which, and the period when, this acknowledged evil of slavery was to be shaken off.

We remember the tone thereafter of the Northern press, urging Virginians, with unbecoming heat, to complete their unfinished labor of manumission.

We remember the Southampton massacre. We do not believe the allegation that it was stimulated by emissaries from the North.

We remember, too, the outraged moral sense of even Southern men, when John C. Calhoun was the pioneer in the hardy assertion "that slavery is a blessing" — proclaiming that opinion in the Senate of the United States. The reply of Wm. C. Rives, expressing his opinion that slavery was an undoubted evil, but one for which the present generation was not altogether responsible, received the sympathy of all who had not allowed habit and interest to indurate their feelings.

Goaded by bitter fanatics in the free States, whose active interference was not justified by the existing position of the question of emancipation, the recalcitration of the South Carolina sophist found numerous imitators. Gradually a funeral pall has been drawn over any rational discussion of the slavery question, and if there be any now here who hold the sentiments once openly expressed, they are only whispered in confidence; even the moderate, the candid, and the humane deem it impolitic to strengthen the hands of outside meddlers by any concessions to their views. No person now can safely reside in the South who is suspected of liberal views on the subject of slavery.

Great is Diana of the Ephesians! "Slavery is a blessing!" says Calhoun, and in this cry the whole slaveocracy, whose craft is in danger, now unite. The flood tide of sophistry has even invaded the Christian church, and submerged, for the present, some of the most precious landmarks of our faith.

In recognition of the cardinal principle of our religion, "*Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself*," Dr. Wayland unfortunately forgot to draw the distinction between *enslaving* and *owning* slaves, and a most graphic representation of the horrors of the slave trade drawn by him and quoted by Dr. Bledsoe, may well be characterized by the latter as an *ignoratio elenchi*, if that be Dr. Wayland's argument against slaveholding. Dr. Bledsoe repels with proper indignation, this unjust confusion of two things, which, if not differing *toto cælo*, have certainly no other resemblance than is often found between an act admitting vindication and one which admits of none.

He insists upon holding Dr. Wayland to the question whether

"slavery is *semper et ubique* morally wrong." This, we feel bound to say, by such argument, is not proven, and Dr. Bledsoe establishes his first fallacy.

§ II. *The Second Fallacy of Abolitionists.*

This second fallacy is not quite so easily disposed of, in our view, as in that of Dr. Bledsoe.

In regard to the institution of slavery, Dr. Wayland says: "I do not see that it does not sanction the whole system of the slave trade. *If I have a right to a thing after I have gotten it, I have a natural right to the means necessary for getting it.*

"If this be so, I should be as much justified in sending a vessel to Africa, murdering a part of the inhabitants of a village, and making slaves of the rest, as I should be in hunting a herd of wild animals, and either slaying them or subjecting them to the yoke.

This reasoning Dr. Bledsoe pronounces a glaring *non sequitur*, which he endeavors thus to expose.

"Let us see how this argument will apply to other things. If I have a right to a watch after I have gotten it, no matter how, then I have a right to use the means necessary to get watches. I may steal them from my neighbors! Or, if I have a right to a wife, provided I can get one, then I may shoot my friend and marry his widow."

Did ever a great name herald to the world so flimsy an argument as this of Dr. Bledsoe! Very little scrutiny will, we think, strip the rags from this falsity, and shift the charge of *non sequitur* to Dr. W.'s respondent.

Dr. Wayland's supposition assumes a *right* to the thing gotten. Dr. Bledsoe's response, by some very novel ethics, supposes it possible to have a right to a thing though it may not be rightfully acquired. A simple possession seems to imply with him a right.

Now we think if the possession was rightfully acquired, it would be right to use the same means to acquire other possessions of the same kind; and if it was wrongfully acquired, the possessor had neither a right in it, nor, *a fortiori*, any right to further acquisition after the same manner. For an LL. D., Dr.

Bledsoe seems not well versed in the proper distinction between "*droit and fait*."

We must here pronounce Dr. Wayland's position sustained, and the "second fallacy" *not proven*.

Let us examine, however, this proposition in reference to Southern slavery. Though the reception of stolen goods, as a general proposition, may be as criminal as theft, it may yet be lawful, under some circumstances, to use and retain what may not have been lawfully acquired.

David and his men are justified of our Lord in having eaten, under the pressure of necessity, of the shew bread which it was not lawful for them to eat.

A man might lawfully, we think, use a stolen horse to escape from peril to his life. He might use a stolen weapon, even against the owner, to defend himself from unjustifiable attack, without too particular an inquiry, at the moment of peril, as to the manner in which those who furnished him with the means of escape or defence, had acquired either. Any proof, however, of unlawful acquisition, would require of him to restore the horse or the weapon to the rightful owner, if practicable, as soon as his own necessary occasion for it had ceased.

In regard to slaves, no one pretends they were rightfully acquired by our ancestors.

They were torn from their homes in the very mode described by Dr. Wayland. The first captors were not actuated by the humane motives of improving the moral and intellectual condition of the African. Public sentiment was at first very obtuse on the subject of the slave trade. The good John Newton was engaged in it many years. It finally became more enlightened, and the most civilized governments of the world took action against it.

Meanwhile the descendants of these unfortunate Africans had been transmitted, like heir-looms, to successive generations, and a portion of our countrymen are now, by inheritance, invested, without their own action, with the questionable right of property in a number of human beings. That necessity compels them to the present retention of this property, we think, can be shown.

It can as easily be shown that, by the laws of Christian ethics, they cannot plead the excuse of their being morally and intellectually unfit for freedom, without doing the utmost in their power to prepare them for that state by proper moral and intellectual culture.

This seems to be the proper point to notice Dr. Bledsoe's

§ III. *Third Fallacy of the Abolitionists.*

The right to hold slaves, Dr. Wayland thinks, "involves the right to use all the means necessary to the establishment and perpetuity of slavery, and *of course the right to crush the slave's intellectual and social nature*, and to stupefy his conscience, in so far as it may be necessary to enable me to enjoy this right with the least possible peril."

This, Dr. Bledsoe pronounces to be a compound fallacy, a many-sided error.

He then argues: "In the first place, if the slaveholder should reason in this way, no one would be more ready than the author himself, to condemn his logic. If any slaveholder should say, 'that because I have a *right* to my slaves, therefore I have the right to crush the intellectual and moral nature of men, in order to *establish* and perpetuate their bondage,' he would be among the first to cry out against such reasoning. This is evident from the fact that he everywhere commends those slaveholders who deem it their duty, as a return for the service of their slaves, to promote both their temporal and eternal good."

Now, let us candidly ask, why does Dr. Wayland commend slaveholders who adopt this treatment of their slaves?

Not, certainly, because he admits for one moment their *right* of ownership, the hinge on which Dr. Bledsoe's reply must be allowed to turn. We have, for the purpose of calling attention to this false postulate, italicised the word "*right*," in our quotation from Dr. Bledsoe. Dr. B. here confounds *right* and *possession*, as we have shown that he elsewhere does *right* and *liberty*.

On both these errors he has erected a superstructure of false logic, for which we can find no better apology, knowing him to

be an able reasoner, than that he has not, any more than certain Abolitionists, held his passions in subjection to reason. He flames up at the imputation of any wrong in Southern slavery, reminding Abolitionists that "it is not quite a hell," and that "Africa is not yet a paradise."

Some religionists imagine an intermediate state called "purgatory," to which the condition of slaves would be more analogous, if there were in practice any process of "purgation" from the ignorance and degradation which, according to Dr. Bledsoe, engendered slavery at first. He fearlessly challenges the solution of what those familiar with slavery regard as an impossible problem—some method for the accomplishment of the "*immediate*" abolition of slavery. "If Abolitionists at the North," he says, "will only invent some method by which all this frightful mass of degradation can be blotted out *at once*, then we will most cheerfully consent." If there be such a mass of moral debasement as he seems to admit, and it cannot be blotted out *at once*, is there no obligation to devise some means for the *gradual* accomplishment of that end?

§ IV. Dr. Bledsoe's Fourth Fallacy of the Abolitionists.

With a view to the full understanding of this imputed fallacy, an extended quotation becomes necessary from Dr. Bledsoe's book. "He (the Abolitionist) is often guilty of a *petitio principii*, in taking it for granted that the institution of slavery is an injury to the slave, which is the very point in dispute. Thus says Dr. Wayland: "If it be asked when [slavery must be abandoned,] I ask again, when shall a man begin to cease doing wrong? Is not the answer—*immediately*? If a man is injuring us do we doubt as to the *time when* he ought to cease? There is no doubt, then, in respect to the time when we ought to cease inflicting injury on others."

"Here," says Dr. Bledsoe, "it is assumed that slavery is an *injury* to the slave: but this is the very point which is denied, and which he should have discussed. If a state of slavery be a greater injury to the slave than a state of freedom would be, then we are willing to admit that it should be abolished. But

even in that case, not *immediately*, unless it could be shown that the remedy would not be worse than the evil. If, on the whole, the institution of slavery be a curse to the slave, we say let it be abolished; not suddenly, however, as if by a whirlwind; but by the counsels of wise, cautious, and far-seeing statesmen, who, capable of looking both before and after, can comprehend, in their plans of reform, all the diversified and highly complicated interests of society."

"But, it may be said," continues the author, (Dr. Wayland,) "immediate abolition would be the greatest possible injury to the slaves themselves. They are not competent to self-government." True, this is the very thing which may be and which is said by every Southern statesman in his advocacy of the institution of slavery. Let us see the author's reply. "This is a question of fact," says he, "*which is not in the province of moral philosophy to decide*. It, very likely, may be so. So far as I know, the facts are not sufficiently known to warrant a full opinion on the subject. We will, therefore, suppose it to be the case, and ask—what is the duty of masters *under these circumstances?*"

In the discussion of this question the author comes to the conclusion that a master may hold his slaves in bondage, provided his intentions be good, and with a view to set them at liberty as soon as they shall be qualified for such a state.

Moral philosophy, then, it seems, when it closes its eyes upon facts, pronounces that slavery should be *immediately* abolished; but if it consider facts, which instead of being denied, are admitted to be "very likely" true, it decides against its immediate abolition! Or, rather, moral philosophy looks at the fact that slavery is an *injury*, in order to see that it be forthwith abolished; but closes its eyes upon the fact that its abolition may be a still greater injury, lest this foregone conclusion should be called in question!

Has moral philosophy, then, an eye only for the facts which lie on one side of the question it proposes to decide?

Sure, such a palpable effort is seldom exhibited, as this of Dr. Bledsoe, to throw a wrangler's dust in the eyes of plain sense!

Dr. Wayland asks: "When is the time for a man to *begin* to cease to do wrong?" He answers himself — "*immediately.*" Dr. Wayland had established the conviction in his own and other minds, that slavery is a wrong, and thinks the wrong doing should *begin* to cease immediately. "But," says an objector, "immediate abolition would be the greatest possible injury to the slaves themselves. They are not fit for self-government." Dr. Wayland rejoins: "This is a question of *fact*, which it is not in the province of moral philosophy to decide;" therein meaning, we suppose, that though moral philosophy might *decide* on an *abstract* question of right or wrong, such as slavery, it would hardly require moral philosophy to decide on simple matters of *evidence*, in relation to the existence of particular *facts*.

Philosophy may reason in regard to those facts, if admitted; and though Dr. Wayland is not sure that the facts, in regard to the present moral condition of slaves, are sufficiently known to warrant an opinion, yet, adopting the hypothesis of the objector, "that slaves are not competent to self-government," he proceeds to state his convictions of duty *under these circumstances*. In strict accordance with his prior proposition, "that wrong doing should *begin* to cease *immediately*," he decides that, though it be not expedient, under the circumstances, that it should *begin to cease*, and should *terminate* at one and the same moment, it should, nevertheless, *begin to cease*, in consequence of some provisions made by the master, with a view to set his slaves at liberty when they shall be qualified for that state. Dr. Bledsoe will, of course, admit that Dr. Wayland intended, that means should be faithfully and diligently employed by masters to bring about this result.

This charge of *petitio principii*, against Dr. Wayland, if tried in a more impartial court than the slave States, must fall to the ground — slavery *per se*, unmitigated by constant effort to raise the slave above that state, being adjudged an evil, *beyond dispute*, in all other lands where the Bible is read and the English tongue spoken.

§ V. *The Fifth Fallacy of the Abolitionists.*

"Suppose that A has the right to use the body of B, according to his — that is A's — will. Now if this be true, it is true universally; and hence, A has control over the body of B, and B has control over the body of C, C of D, &c., and Z again over the body of A; that is, every separate will has the control over some other body besides its own, and has no right or control over its own body or intellect." (Moral Science.)

"Now," says Dr. Bledsoe, "if men were cut out of pasteboard, all exactly alike, and distinguished from each other only by the letters of the alphabet, then the reasoning of the author would be excellent. But it happens that men are not cut out of pasteboard. They are distinguished by differences of character, by diverse habits and propensities, which render the reasonings of the political philosopher rather more difficult than if he had to deal with or arrange the letters of the alphabet. In one, for example, the intellectual and moral part is almost wholly eclipsed by the brute; while in another, reason and religion have gained the ascendancy, so as to maintain a steady empire over the whole man. The first, as the author himself admits, is incompetent to self-government, and should therefore be held by the laws of society in a state of servitude."

Before advancing with Dr. Bledsoe's examination of the argument, we must remind the reader that Dr. Wayland *does not* admit that any individual should be held in servitude for any longer period than shall be necessary to fit him for freedom. With this caution we resume.

Dr. Bledsoe argues, in substance, that this right of controlling another's will could not rationally proceed in the circle imagined by Dr. Wayland, each individual link in this continuous chain being governed as well as governing.

The difference between a Hottentot and a Newton repels, he thinks, all rational propriety in the idea that an intellect so godlike as that of Newton should not have more right to control the poor Hottentot, than the latter should have over him. Let us ask of Dr. Bledsoe if superiority in intellect or morals confess a right to control all who may be less favored by Provi-

dence? Such a right may perhaps arise from an *existing duty*, as that of parent over child, or the duties which often devolve on individuals in their relation to maniacs or idiots. In the exercise, however, of such a right, springing from a duty, is the individual empowered to convert the bodily labor of inferiors to his own physical uses, and do nothing or next to nothing, in effort to elevate them in the moral and intellectual scale, and thus at the same time emancipate them from servitude, and himself from further performance of this duty? On the contrary, humanity is so tender in regard to misfortune, that no labor is required of maniacs nor of idiots, though, if it were thought right to make them labor, instead of curing their mental maladies, they would, no doubt, be very useful animals. Children are rightfully made to labor. Among the many reasons which might be given, we will give the one most analogous to the subject under discussion — that they may be fitted to self-maintenance and self-protection.

Would a parent, however, be thought to discharge his duty, who failed at the same time to give the best instruction in his power, intellectual, moral, and religious? Would he be justified in extending his control over his offspring beyond the period when he should have reached intellectual maturity, even were it in his power?

Such a right, arising from the duty which may devolve on the inheritor (perhaps an unwilling one) of slaves, we are willing to concede. His right seems to be to use their labor while they (or their descendants) are being prepared for the state of freedom; and the right does not include, we think, any individual who is already prepared for that state. Do Dr. Bledsoe, and those who, like him, found the slaveholder's right on the inferiority of the African, make any effort to manumit immediately the better specimens of that unfortunate race?

Does any one hear of the manumission of a slave because he was skilled in any useful art, because he was honest, or because he was pious? The reverse is the case. Such are held in equal bondage, as far as our observation goes, with the most vicious lout who ever wielded hoe. Consult the Southern press

for advertisements regarding the sale of "carpenters, blacksmiths, shoemakers;" or other advertisements offering large rewards for the apprehension of such, should they break their bonds. Those who by their industry show that they could maintain themselves in a state of freedom, are sometimes allowed to purchase that privilege with the proceeds of extra hours of toil.

There is one state in which the Southern master sometimes consents to sever these links of steel — when he feels himself approaching those grim shores to which he cannot convey this property; and where, if he could, the slave would be "free from his master."

Under the stings of conscience, whole estates of slaves are sometimes bequeathed their freedom; and the bequest is often accompanied with a liberal provision for their establishment in their new condition.

How often, however, are such bequests disputed by rapacious relatives of the testator! To the honor of Southern courts be it spoken, such wills are generally sustained, despite the invariable effort to show that the testator was not of sound mind.

To return to Dr. Bledsoe's "fifth fallacy," we think it devolves on him to show that any one man has a *right* in another, separate from such duties as we have supposed, on the mere ground of mental or moral superiority. This doctrine is indeed shadowed out (as we shall take occasion to show) in other parts of Dr. Bledsoe's work.

Such ethics would probably scale the right of suffrage and all other civil rights by the gauge of intellect, from the college professor down to the hewer of wood; and we should have a board of examiners to determine the numerical value, according to that standard, of each man's vote, as well as how high in the scale of social or political advancement he should be entitled to go. We do not then see that Dr. Bledsoe has weakened Dr. Wayland's position, which seems to us only a *reductio ad absurdum*, to deny the *right* of property in a human being. The proof of that right rests with the affirmant, and will require better logic than has yet been produced by Dr. Bledsoe.

§ VI. *The Sixth Fallacy of the Abolitionist.*

This seems to be an issue of fact between Dr. Bledsoe and Dr. Wayland — the latter having asserted that the institution of slavery “is condemned by the natural conscience of man, from at least as far back as the time of Aristotle.”

Not having undertaken to be the advocate of Dr. Wayland, we leave to him the defence of his own assertion. The settlement of this question is not necessary, we think, to our object now; and its attempt by us would only show a disposition to dispute *dentibus et unguibus* every position of Dr. Bledsoe — a disposition we utterly abjure. Truth is the object of our search, and wherever she requires it we shall be found supporting Dr. Bledsoe.

§ VII. *The Seventh Fallacy of Abolitionists.*

“‘Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,’ is the rule of action,” says Dr. Bledsoe, “which, in the estimation of Abolitionists, should at once and forever decide every good man against the institution of slavery.” Dr. Wayland says, “the moral precepts of the Bible are diametrically opposed to slavery. These are, ‘Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,’ and ‘All things whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye also unto them.’ Now were this precept obeyed,” he continues, “it is manifest slavery could not, in fact, exist a single instant. The principle of the precept is absolutely subversive of the principle of slavery.”

“If strong assertion were argument,” says Dr. Bledsoe, “we no doubt should be overwhelmed by the irresistible logic of Dr. Wayland. But the assertion of no man can be accepted as sound argument. We want to know the meaning of the words of the great Teacher, and to be guided by *that*, rather than the words of any earthly oracle.”

In approaching the investigation of this precept, we might well whisper to Dr. Bledsoe — “Take off thy shoes! The ground whereon thou standest is holy.”

Can it be credited that a votary of Christ — his minister, we believe — in discussing the *meaning* of that pure and holy

commandment, could connect with it, by way of explanation, such a proposition as follows :

"A wrong desire in one relation of life is not a reason for a wrong act in another relation thereof."

"A man may desire the estate, he may desire the man-servant, or the maid-servant, or the wife of his neighbor, but this is no reason why he should abandon his own man-servant, or his maid-servant, or his wife, to the will of another."

Could any but the most determined sophist — one who set out with the intention to subvert the truth — have so distorted this sacred text ?

Did the Savior of men in that text mean, "All things (be they good or evil) ye would have men do unto you, do ye also unto them?" or, by a further distortion and inversion, "Whatsoever things (good or evil) ye desire to do unto men, suffer them also to do unto you?"

We find something akin to this perversion in one of Walter Scott's tales. "Do as ye're done by, Hobbie; the scripture says so."

"The criminal," Dr. Bledsoe tells us, "who trembles at the bar of justice, may desire both judge and jury to acquit him; but this is no reason why, if acting in the capacity of either judge or juror, he should bring in a verdict of acquittal in favor of one justly accused of crime." A child may now perceive the inference to which Dr. Bledsoe would conduct us. He would lead us away from the bearing of this "Golden Rule" on the subject of slavery, to a proposition of his own, to which that rule bears but little affinity. This question is not whether the *unfortunate* slave has not more right to his liberty, than the *criminal* has to a verdict of acquittal, but whether, by the rule quoted, "any man can properly *desire* the possession of a fellow man;" or, by an extension of the principle, if he find himself, by no act of his, with such possession, he can *consent* to its retention longer than necessity and humanity may require.

Dr. Bledsoe mends his logic a little when he says, "If a man were a child, he might wish to be exempt from the wholesome restraint of his parents; but, this, as every one will admit, is

no reason why he should abandon his own children to themselves."

Only pursue this analogy, and it leads to the result desired by all the friends of humanity. A parent lawfully restrains his child, until he is fitted for self-government; so may a master his slaves, and *no longer*. The main argument, however, that by the Savior's precept, a man should not *desire* the possession of slaves, is still untouched.

The advantage which Dr. Bledsoe imagines himself to have obtained in this part of the argument, is pursued and dwelt upon with evident complacency.

The precept we have been discussing "is used," he asserts, by Abolitionists, "to hoodwink and deceive the conscience."

He fortifies himself by quoting from Leviticus xix., the precept, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself;" yet showing in chapter xxv., it is written, "Of the children of the strangers that do sojourn among you, of them shall ye buy, and of their families that are with you, which they begat in your land, and they shall be your possession. And ye shall take them for an inheritance for your children after you, to inherit them for a possession; they shall be your bondsmen forever."

"This language," says Dr. Bledsoe, "is too plain for controversy. In regard to this very passage, in which the Hebrews are commanded to enter upon and take possession of the land of the Canaanites, Dr. Wayland is constrained to admit, 'The authority to take them as slaves seems to be a part of this original, peculiar, and I may say, anomalous grant.' (Letters, page 50.)"

Dr. Wayland endeavors to escape from the conclusion that this language is *prophetic* and not *mandatory*. However that may be in the Hebrew Bible, which we admit to be of higher authority, the septuagint version is imperative in its character. The word, "ye shall buy," (κτήσεσθε,) is, it is true, a future; but the words, "they shall be your possession," ("ἔστωσαν ὑμῖν εἰς κατὰχρῆσιν,") are in the imperative mood, and, strictly rendered, mean "*Let them* be to you for a possession."

We do not think it necessary to argue that point. Our convictions are, that for reasons supposed by both disputants, God either ordained or permitted slavery at that time. The dark and sanguinary idolatries of the heathen nations who were expelled by the Israelites, made them the objects of God's wrath. And we may well assume that the divine vengeance which could be justified at the fall of Jericho, in the utter destruction "of all that was in the city, both man and woman, young and old, and ox, and sheep, and ass, with the edge of the sword," can scarcely be oppugned for the temporary ordinance of such a state as slavery; *temporary*, we say, for we mean to take the ground that, though it might be proper in that and other benighted ages, it is *now* opposed to human progress and the principles of the gospel of Christ.

We propose, in the progress of this essay, to show how little the specious excuse for slavery, of "Christianizing and civilizing" the African race, is carried out in practice. That, however, in its place. Dr. Bledsoe also claims for the institution of slavery, not only the historical testimony of the New Testament, but the sanction of its principles. In the first part of this proposition, when we come to examine his "Argument from the Scriptures," we shall sustain him, though we cannot subscribe to the latter clause.

Dr. Bledsoe argues that Southern masters "*do as they clearly see they ought to be done by if their conditions*" (and those of their slaves) "*were changed.*" If we could think so, this book would never have been written.

On the negative or affirmative of that proposition will depend the justice of his philippic against learned divines, who differ with him in the interpretation of the text which heads this section, as much as they do in credulity in regard to the motives which now perpetuate slavery in the South, or the existence of any general effort to ameliorate the condition of slaves. Most honorable exceptions must, no doubt, be made to the general apathy; but they are only verdant spots in the "great waste" of selfishness and luxury which is included by the Southern horizon, and beyond which few eyes care to penetrate.

§ VIII. *The Eighth Fallacy of the Abolitionist.*

This is, according to Dr. Bledsoe, the argument drawn from the divine attributes against the institution of slavery. As we desire and expect that every one who reads this book, will read Dr. Bledsoe for himself, we omit irrelevant declamation, and proceed to the argument.

Dr. Wayland says, "If Jefferson trembled for his country when he remembered that God is just, and declared that, 'in case of insurrection, the Almighty has no attribute that can take part with us in the contest,' surely it becomes a disciple of Jesus Christ to pause and reflect."

"Now let it be borne in mind," responds Dr. Bledsoe, "that all this proceeds from a man, from a professed disciple of Jesus Christ, who, in various places, has truly as well as emphatically said, '*The duty of slaves* is also explicitly made known in the Bible. They are bound to *obedience, fidelity, submission*, and respect to their masters,' &c., &c. (Moral Science.)"

Does Dr. Bledsoe pretend that what was ordained for one age is suited to every age and circumstance? That none of the Mosaic ordinances were repealed by the Great Teacher? Or that he did not *totidem verbis* condemn that spirit which prompts in man the desire of superiority to his fellow? Let us examine.

In Math. xix. 3—8, the Saviour is inquired of by the Pharisees if it were lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause. "And he answered and said unto them, Have ye not read, that he which made them from the beginning made them male and female, and said, for this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife; and they twain shall be one flesh? Wherefore they are no more twain, but one flesh. What, therefore, God hath joined together, let not man put asunder.

"They say unto him, Why did Moses then command to give a writing of divorcement, and to put her away?

"He saith unto them, Moses, because of the *hardness of your hearts, suffered* you to put away your wives; but from the beginning it was not so."

Here seems to be the annunciation of a *higher law*, better suited to the purity of man's nature *in the beginning*, and to that purity which it was the mission of the New Covenant to *restore*. Might not the divine permission to purchase and hold slaves also suit hard-hearted Jews and infidels better than the professed followers of Him who was meek and lowly; who took on him the form of a servant, and who had not where to lay his head?

In Math. chap. xx., does not our Lord reply to those who sought great things for themselves thus:

"Ye know that the princes of the *Gentiles* exercise dominion over them, and they that are great exercise authority upon them. But it shall not be so among you; but whosoever will be *great* among you, let him be your minister, (διάκονος.) And whosoever will be *chief* among you, let him be your servant, (δοῦλος.)

In Math. xxiii. 10, 11, we read:

"Neither be ye called masters; for one is your Master, even Christ. But he that is greatest among you shall be your servant." Candor, however, obliges us to state that in the original tongue, the word here translated "master," (καθηγητής) only means "chief," or "leader;" and the original word, in verse 11, for servant, is the same word elsewhere translated "minister," which means sometimes servant, but never slave. It is worthy of quotation, however, as rebuking the general spirit of self-seeking and ambition, as the context shows.

Dr. Bledsoe consoles himself for this admission of a great man, and a slaveholder too, with the reflection, that if he (Mr. Jefferson) were now living, he would join the Calhouns, Websters, (?) and Clays, (?) who have discovered such arguments as his (Mr. J.'s) to be mere moonshine.

We congratulate the University of Virginia, that the chair filled by Dr. Bledsoe (Mathematics) is devoted to an *exact* science — one in which falsities cannot be made to take the garb of truth; and we congratulate the world, that moral propositions, which have received the assent of Locke, Blackstone, Burke, Mackintosh, Macaulay, Channing, Wayland, and *nine-tenths of this community twenty-five years ago*, will require for their over-

throw something more powerful than the mixture of sophistry, resentment against abolition views, and declamation, which characterizes the work of Dr. Bledsoe. If the full opinions of Henry Clay and Daniel Webster were adduced on the subject of slavery, Dr. Bledsoe would be obliged to impugn the testimony of his own witnesses.

§ IX. *The Ninth Fallacy of the Abolitionists.*

Dr. Wayland's Moral Science, Part II, Chapter I, Section 2, reads :

"Domestic slavery proceeds upon the principle that the master has the right to control the action—physical and intellectual—of the slave, for his own (that is the master's) benefit," &c. And again: "It supposes that the Creator intended one human being to govern the physical, intellectual, and moral actions of as many other human beings as, by purchase, he can bring within his physical power; and that *one human being may thus acquire the right to sacrifice the happiness of any number of other human beings, for the purpose of promoting his own.*"

This Dr. Bledsoe repels in most indignant terms, and contends that slavery in the United States is a "civil institution," and not founded in individual wrong; that so far from being *intended* to sacrifice the happiness of the slave to the selfish interests of the master—"no one who has looked at both sides of this great question can be ignorant that the legislation at the South proceeds on the principle that slavery is beneficial, not to the master only, but also and *especially* to the slave." Three errors are here discernible; two in logic, and one in fact.

The first is, in taking for granted that, because slavery is a civil institution, it cannot be founded on individual wrong. Now, if a number of individuals who are doing wrong can procure a legislative enactment to sanction that wrong, that legislation creates a civil institution *founded* on individual wrong, if we do not mistake.

Secondly, loose legislation, which defends, strictly, the rights and privileges of a superior class in society, but is not

clearly framed in such wise as to secure the happiness and comfort of an inferior class, may be *intended* equally to benefit both classes, but its practical working will be to allow the superior class all powers not expressly withheld; and one human being may thus enjoy the unrestricted *liberty* (and the right, too, if neglect in legislation *could* imply that right) to tyrannize over the happiness of many.

The error in *fact* is, that Southern legislation is based on the ground or principle, that slavery is beneficial, *not to the master only, but also and especially to the slave*. The fact is, that all the legislation in the old slave states was anterior to the discovery of Mr. Calhoun's and Dr. Bledsoe's NEW TRUTH: "That slavery is a blessing, and so far from being intended to secure their happiness, was only designed to secure to their owners the largest benefit from their possession." The only difference made by the laws between them and other working animals, is that the master does not possess the power of life and death. He may be indicted for cruelty to a slave, it is true, as well as for cruelty to a horse; but when were the statutes to that effect enforced?

The marriages of slaves are not legal. Even when the marriage ceremony is performed, few masters scruple to sever that tie at their convenience. When man thus puts asunder those whom God has joined together, what generally occurs? The parties soon form new relations of the same kind in their new homes, or, more generally still, no marriages occur, and promiscuous lewdness is common on many estates. Proprietors who claim to be thought moral or religious, do not inquire into the paternity of the young slaves born on the estate; they are mostly *fili nullius*.

If Catholics are said to have but half a Gospel, because of their being forbidden to read the Scriptures, blacks enjoy but a tithe of that great gift from God to man. The instruction, in both cases, is oral, with this difference: The free Romanist may attend the ministrations of his priest, and decency requires that he should do so. The negro, from his position on rural estates, has not always the opportunity; from the exacting nature of his

servitude, has not always the liberty; and, from his debased moral condition and the want of compulsion, usually pays no attention to religious matters. Abraham circumcised his household, thus, no doubt, accomplishing the chief purpose for which slavery was permitted. Joshua answered for himself and his household that they would serve the Lord.

How, it will be asked, is this mass of ignorance and pollution to be reached with any therapeutic? We say, by teaching them to read God's word! "But that," argues Dr. Bledsoe and Southern legislators, "would be dangerous! They would read *other books* besides the bible, and their intellectual natures might become too refined, their sensibilities aroused; we should lose our possessions—perhaps our lives!"

Is not this "crushing man's moral and intellectual nature," to enable his master to enjoy his possession with the least possible peril? Is not this possessing the liberty, if not the right, to sacrifice the happiness of our fellow men to our own?

The very men who charge Romanists with giving garbled oral instruction, are restricting their own slaves to such.

Now we would ask: Who is the giver of every good and perfect gift? Who must be confessed to be the great source of inspiration, whence ultimately men derive their inventive faculties? If God had nothing to do with the art of printing, then our argument is an abortion; but if he had, and designed it for the promotion of man's *greatest good*, then, we contend, *it was given by him to man for the express purpose of disseminating the Gospel*. For this purpose it as far transcends oral instruction as the swift car the lumbering wain. The printed Gospel is a teacher always at hand, readily compared with itself, unmixed with human pride or human frailty; showing the truth without fear of human censure or despotic legislation. If the Bible inculcates the virtues of obedience to the powers that be, why such fear in regard to entrusting it to slaves?

Admit the fear to be just, that slaves may become dissatisfied and seek their liberty, it must also be granted that they are thereby better prepared for it; a state which, says the pseudo philanthropic slaveholder, "we desire they should attain. We

cannot, however," says he, "admit instruction in reading as a means to that end."

We answer: "Instruct your slaves and leave the result with God! You counteract his evident purpose in refusing to do so, and you sanction all the allegations of Abolitionists against the sincerity of your motives or assertions."

The Southern slave is an indolent animal. He is seldom overtaken, and is abundantly though coarsely fed. He is so trained in the submission of his will to that of his master, that his bonds are scarcely visible to the casual observer, all goes on so smoothly. Contumacy in slaves, here, however, as elsewhere, produces the same indignation which always characterizes those who are unused to the least contradiction. Punishment follows proportioned only by the master's will. If a man choose to play the tyrant, there is no law to call him to account, unless some gross cruelty is perpetrated. Except, then, his dole of coarse food, and protection from gross bodily harm, we can recognize no *benefit* conferred on Southern slaves beyond instruction in the most primitive duties of agricultural toil, or imperfect instruction in some handicraft. The fruit of his labor enures to the master. All the laws are shaped to favor the slaveholding interest. Slaves are hired by the year; and should a slave die in one week from the hiring, *the proprietor receives the whole hire*. Should the slave be sick the whole year, his services must still be paid for.

Should a slave die, your sympathy is claimed for the master who has lost a valuable servant, and not for the poor servant or his mourning connections.

If a vicious servant commit a capital crime the master is *compensated for the loss of his slave* — a sort of backhanded encouragement, we opine, to moral and religious training.

The same offences, such as arson, rape, and murderous assault, which are punished with imprisonment if committed by a white, are death to the slave. The death penalty, if deserved by a slave, is always adjudged; *while it is next to an impossibility to convict a white of a capital crime*. This is the sort of even-handed justice extended by Southern legislation to the slave, for his *especial* benefit. These are some of the *facts* which lie within

the reach of evidence, though they be not "within the province of the moral philosopher."

§ X. *The Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth and Sixteenth Fallacies of the Abolitionist; or, his seven Arguments against the right of a man to hold property in his fellowman.*

"This claim of property in a human being," says Dr. Channing, "is altogether false, groundless. A human being cannot be justly owned." The only difficulty to maintain this proposition is, according to Dr. Channing, "on account of its exceeding obviousness." "The consciousness of our humanity involves the persuasion that we cannot be owned, like a brute or a tree."

"This," replies Dr. Bledsoe, "is one of the hackneyed common-places of the Abolitionist. We freely admit that a human being cannot be owned, as a tree or a brute. A tree, he says, may be *absolutely* owned. The owner of a tree may do what he pleases with his own, provided he do no harm or injury with it. He may cut it down; and, if he please, he may beat it as long as he has the power to raise an arm," &c. &c., "*for a tree has no rights.*"

Dr. Bledsoe rejects with scornful ridicule the argument of "*consciousness*"—Plato's main argument for the immortality of the soul. He "freely admits, however, that a man cannot be owned, as a tree or a brute."

Now, he cannot make this admission from regard to the *natural* right of a man to liberty or life, for he has already attempted to show that he did not possess those rights until they were conferred by society. But the laws of some countries do not protect the lives of slaves. The master possessed the right of life and death over his slave, in the polished Roman Empire. See the sixth satire of Juvenal, lines 173–177, where an imperious wife demands from her husband the crucifixion of a slave, though admitting he had done no wrong.

"O demeus! ita servus homo est? Nil fecerit. Esto;
Hoc volo; sic jubeo; sit pro ratione voluntas."

Thus, we see, society does not always protect the lives of men. Nor does it always permit a tree to be *absolutely* owned. At this very time, in Great Britain, the owner cannot cut down a tree which the Queen's officer has marked with her broad arrow. What then becomes of Dr. Bledsoe's proposition, which rests on man's *natural* rights, or on any uniform system of legislation. He must be driven to a modification of his proposition, viz.: "that a human being *is not* (under Southern laws) owned, like a tree or a brute."

Yet these laws do not distinguish entirely after Dr. Bledsoe's mode, between a man and a tree. He may, here, destroy the latter, and not the former; but he may beat his slave, as well as his tree, "as long as he can raise his arm." No one will gainsay him, if he does this act with *decent* privacy, and stops short of murder. We have already adverted to the great difficulty of convicting whites of capital offences. Dr. Bledsoe insists that the real question is: "*Can one man have a right to the personal service or obedience of another without his consent?*"

Our own views of this question have already been expressed, but for the sake of clearness we answer Dr. Bledsoe's interrogatory with a general proposition.

We have shown, we think, that "*A man has no right to the personal service of another without his consent, unless that right arise from some duty; and that it must determine when that duty is performed; that is, when children or apprentices shall have reached their majority, and idiots, maniacs, and slaves shall have attained capacity of self-government and self-protection.*"

Dr. Bledsoe's review of Dr. Channing's "seven arguments" against slavery, is, much of it, a reiteration of his previous argument against the views of Dr. Wayland.

We shall not follow his example in fighting over again these battles. He is an adroit logomachist; and if he cannot penetrate his adversary's armor, will at least knock off any blemish from its exterior. Of this character is his notice of a technical blunder of Mr. Charles Sumner, in an address before the people of New York, May 9, 1855. We cheerfully accord to Dr. Bledsoe the merit of understanding the legal distinc-

tion between a “mere chattel,” and “chattel personal,” better than he does another legal distinction—that between *droit* and *fait*—confounding, as he everywhere does, the mere possession of slaves with the *right* to their services.

The laws of the slave states do make this distinction, but much of it is lost in their administration.

It is not our purpose to take up the clubs for Mr. Sumner, any more than for Dr. Wayland; we therefore leave him to make his own rejoinder should he so choose.

§ XI. *The Seventeenth Fallacy of the Abolitionist; or the Argument drawn from the Declaration of Independence.*

The language, the propriety or the true meaning of which Dr. Bledsoe would debate, is as follows:

“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”

Any reader of Dr. Bledsoe's book, up to this point, could now very well anticipate his line of argument. He thus explains *his* view of equal rights:

“This maxim does not mean that all men have equal right to political power, or to posts of honor. No doubt the words are often understood in this sense by those who, without reflection, merely echo the Declaration of Independence; but in this sense they are utterly untenable. If all men had *by nature* an equal right to any of the *offices of government*, how could the rights be adjusted? How could the conflict be reconciled? It is clear that all men could not be President of the United States; and if all men had an equal natural right to that office, no one man could be elevated to it without a wrong to all the rest. In such case, all men should have, at least, an equal chance to occupy the presidential chair. Such equal chance could not result from the right of all men to offer themselves as candidates for the office; for at the bar of public opinion, vast multitudes would not have

the least shadow of chance. The only way to effect such an object would be by resorting to the lot. We might thus determine who among so many equally just claimants should actually possess the power of the supreme magistrate."

We so far agree with Dr. Bledsoe, as this: "This maxim does not mean that all men have equal *right* to political power." Dr. Bledsoe, and those whose rights he advocates — as the tailor saw in the Falls of Niagara "but a glorious place to sponge a coat" — see only how far the Declaration might confer the *power to govern*. We see in that glorious instrument a declaration of the rights of men to choose by whom they shall *be governed*. We have italicized certain portions of our quotation from him for a special purpose.

We deny that men could, *by nature*, have any right to the *offices of government*, because in a state of nature neither government nor offices existed. Man, in that state, would have no one to govern but himself and his family. In the social state, into which he next entered, he would probably consent to part with a small portion of that right, for the privilege of choosing the person under whose government the remainder could be best secured; or, if he were very despotic, and regardless of the rights of others, might arrogate this power to govern to himself. We will not entertain the latter view — that of a despotism, but confine ourselves to a government of equity, which we will suppose is the one meant.

Dr. Bledsoe goes on to show, from reason and history, the folly of choosing magistrates by lot, in which no one will probably differ with him, and at length proceeds:

"If all men have not a natural right to fill an office of government, who has this right? Who has the natural right, for example, to occupy the office of President of the United States. Certainly, some men have no such right." Again, "Who has such a right, then? such a natural right, or right according to the law of nature or *reason*?" [Here, we think, he seems to have had a glimmering suspicion that man had *no natural right* to govern his fellow.] "The man, we answer, who, all things considered, is the best qualified to dis-

charge the duties of the office; — the man who, by his superior wisdom, and virtue, and statesmanship, would use the power of such an office *more* effectually for the good of the whole people, than would *any other man*. If there be one such man, and only one, he of *natural right* should be our President."

Dr. Bledsoe forgets that, *by his own limitation*, there *could* be but one such man; for but *one* could use any power *more* effectually *than any other man*. We will presently see to what that conclusion leads.

Suppose, then, that this man of superior excellence is found, what shall be his term of office? Shall he vacate the place for which he alone is best fitted, in favor of an inferior capacity? No! The right which placed him there, will there retain him — he becomes perpetual President—Dictator—King!!!

Again, says Dr. Bledsoe:

"What is so clearly true in regard to the office of President, is equally true in regard to all the offices of government. It is contrary to natural right, to justice, that fools, or knaves, or demagogues should occupy seats in Congress; yet all these classes are sometimes seen there, and by the law of the land are entitled to their seats. Here, again, that which is right and fit in itself is different from that which exists under the law."

How can that be, we ask Dr. Bledsoe, when all rights, according to him, are derived from the law?

He continues: "The same remarks, it is evident, are applicable to governors, to sheriffs, to constables, and to justices of the peace."

The same reasoning with which we contended that this would lead to dictatorship or monarchy, would perpetuate the inferior offices, and create an oligarchy. Hereditary monarchy and peerages would follow, and we should retrograde a century in human rights, to the cast off wrongs of primogeniture, entail, and an established church.

Dr. Bledsoe's is a very fine Utopia, as he seems to suspect himself. If *perfect men* could be found — *perfectly incorruptible*, too, in reference to the charms of power, or the spoils of

place — we should not only consent to such a government, but pray that the incumbents might live for ever. Knowing, however, as we do, how the “old Adam” besets the best men, we are in favor of the good old democratic doctrine of “rotation in office,” and alternation in the dominancy of parties. The bad effect of long-continued power is too well understood in the influence of slavery in producing impatience of contradiction, touchiness and violent resentment of little wrongs, luxury, and idleness. We are sorry to be obliged to make these admissions.

We have strayed in Dr. Bedsoe’s Utopia until we had nearly forgot the exordium to the Declaration of Independence. What, then, did the words “all men are created equal,” &c., mean? Did they mean that there was no such thing as an idiot? — a maniac? — an infant? Or did they mean that all these classes possessed, in spite of their disabilities, the unfettered right to “liberty and the pursuit of happiness,” to the same extent as the most favored individuals of our race?

They mean, as we think, no more than to assert a general proposition touching man’s moral and intellectual nature.

The exceptions would be excluded by the rule. It does not, fortunately, require every man to be a Solomon, in order to appreciate the wisdom of others. A man’s prudence and equity may be inferred, even by weak capacities, from the way in which he conducts his affairs. Thus free or constitutional governments have not applied a political dynamometer to voters, with a view to ascertain the value of their votes; but have, generally, been content with the horizontal standard of sanity, good character and maturity.

We would add for our own country, such a knowledge of the principles of our government as cannot be possessed by the newly arrived emigrant, or the ignorant slave, while that unfortunate class shall exist among us.

The apostle Paul was a constitutionalist. Hear him! Cor. xii, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 22:

"If the foot shall say, Because I am not the hand, I am not of the body; is it not therefore of the body?"

"And if the ear shall say, Because I am not the eye, I am not of the body; is it not therefore of the body?"

"If the whole body were an eye, where were the hearing? If the whole body were the hearing, where were the smelling?"

"And if all were one member, where were the body?"

"The eye cannot say unto the hand, I have no need of thee; nor again the head to the feet, I have no need of you.

"Nay, more, those members of the body which seem to be more feeble, are necessary."

Dr. Bledsoe argues in favor of limiting the elective franchise to certain classes, "on the high and holy ground that they were not included in the condition by which [this privilege] should be extended to any." How he manages, on this principle, to exclude the suffrage of an intelligent and educated free black, we do not see. We know of one such, prepared for college by the care of an American philanthropist — graduated in an English University, and afterwards graduated in the European schools of medicine. This man successfully maintained, in a debate in the New York Tabernacle, the converse of the proposition "that blacks are intellectually inferior to whites;" himself a living refutation of that opinion, and a proof of what might be accomplished, if effort were made to elevate and not to keep down that unfortunate race. That no doubt may be entertained in regard to the individual we allude to, or the facts detailed, we will name James McCune Smith, of New York, as the one spoken of. This man could give a more intelligent vote than one-half the white citizens in any of the great sections of this confederacy.

We do not contend that the time has come for the universal suffrage of free men of color; but we contest the humanity of any legislation by which the mental capacities of slaves are refused the opportunity of development; or the justice of any opinion, formed under their present circumstances, that they cannot be rendered capable of intelligent self government.

We pursue the task of exposing the fallacies of Dr. Bledsoe. Dr. Channing, admitting that, by possibility, men might be found in a state of slavery, and not yet fit, in consequence of long continued debasement, to exercise the functions of a free citizen, inquires what disposition should be made of such. He comes to the conclusion that though "the slave cannot rightfully, and should not, be owned by the individual," yet, "like every other citizen, *he is subject to the community* ; and the community has a right, and is bound to continue all such restraints as its own safety and the well-being of the slave demands."

In answer to the question, Whether the community has the right to compel "a man," a "rational and immortal being," to work? (the turned commas are Dr. Bledsoe's,) Dr. Channing replies, "If he (the slave) cannot be induced to work, by rational and natural motives, he should be obliged to labor, on the same principle on which the vagrant in other communities is confined and compelled to earn his bread."

"Now, if a man be 'confined,' and 'compelled' to work," says Dr. Bledsoe, "in his confinement, what becomes of his 'inalienable rights to liberty?' We think there must be a slight mistake somewhere. Perhaps it is in the Declaration of Independence."

Let St. Paul answer Dr. Bledsoe. "If any will not work, neither shall he eat." No man, we should suppose, has an "inalienable right" to subsist on the labors of others, without compensation to them, whether he be bond or free, rich or poor. The rule is general.

Every man—without regard to his condition—able, and yet not willing to work, and unable to purchase food and clothing, must perish or subsist by plunder.

He is then a *criminal*, and must be so treated. If he be a slave, by the will of Providence, without the capacity to provide for his own wants, his labor may lawfully, we think, be directed by some superior intelligence; and the guardian or master who so advantageously directs his labors, deserves, in

some degree, to profit by them; always with the reservation on our part, that this relation of master and slave is to continue no longer than the safety of the community shall require; and that every effort be made by individuals and the State to restore to the individual slave the natural liberty so necessarily restrained. No "inalienable right," in our view, is abridged or parted with here. No individual has the right to subsist by plunder; and if by so doing, like a predatory wolf, he loses his liberty of action, he has not parted with any inalienable right, but has measurably lost the "rational" and "moral" type of his pursuit, on which his rights are based. He does not pursue his own happiness or good, but at the expense of the happiness or good of others.

The Declaration of Independence did not contemplate such a "pursuit of happiness;" no one would probably do this who did not view it through the kaleidoscope of Dr. Bledsoe.

The whole energy of Dr. Bledsoe's argument, in this as well as preceding sections, is based on the *present* unfitness of the slave for freedom. We do not feel disposed to contend for anything on behalf of the slave, beyond such treatment, moral, intellectual, and religious, as shall at some distant day make him an intelligent freeman.

There are two remaining issues between us and Dr. Bledsoe, in regard to the religious instruction of slaves; the first, an issue of fact; the second, one of principle.

Dr. Bledsoe remarks, "It will be said, the slave has also a right to religious instruction, as well as to food and raiment. So plain a proposition no one doubts. But is this right regarded at the South? No more, we fear, than in many other portions of the so called Christian world.

"Our children, too, and our poor destitute neighbors often suffer, we fear, the same wrong at our remiss hands, and from our cold hearts. Though we have done much, and would fain do more, yet this truth must be confessed: this sacred and imperious claim has not been fully met by us."

Leaving the North to defend itself from the charge, by innu-

endo, of equal remissness, we proceed to examine the portions of Dr. Bledsoe's remarks which we have italicised.

Unless the religious instruction of slaves in other States is better than here in Virginia, of which we have not been informed, (and which we doubt,) here is a great error in fact. Our children and neighbors have *not* their moral sense so perverted by living in *legalized lewdness* as to make any religious instruction *proceeding from the same source* a solemn farce. Our children and neighbors are permitted by law to be instructed in reading. Sunday schools for white children exist everywhere among us. Until lately, there were none for blacks, and there are very few now.

A few benevolent proprietors have Sunday schools for their own servants. In a pastoral letter of Bishop Mead, written twenty years since, we find, "It is dreadful to think how, while the little ones of a more favored order are the objects of such deep anxiety and laborious zeal throughout our country, while *Sunday schools* are multiplying in every direction, and *books and tracts* are thickly scattered over the land for their benefit, *scarcely anything* is yet done for the moral benefit of hundreds of thousands of these poor little ignorant creatures, who are growing up under every possible disadvantage, and exposed to the strongest temptations to every vice."

On the same page he says, "It is ours to legislate for their souls and bodies, and say whether they shall read the word of God for themselves, or hear it from others. How fearful the trust reposed in us! Who does not tremble at the thought of the responsibility which must belong to it? If we must render an account for the right use of the gold and silver committed to us; if the rust thereof shall witness against us; if the hire of those who have reaped our fields, which has been unjustly withheld, shall cry out against us; oh, what will become of us, when we shall stand charged with the guilt of neglecting the immortal souls of those who have been devoting their time and strength to our service? What must be our condition when we see them perishing through that ignorance which we sought not to remove?"

In concluding this letter, so creditable to the understanding and the heart of the good Bishop, he uses this language, which, as the exponent of the sentiments of some even of this day, we transcribe:

“Finally, men and brethren, the cry of our perishing servants comes up to us from the sultry plains, as they bend at their toils. It comes up to us from the midst of their ignorance and superstition, and adultery and lewdness. Shall we disregard it? The cry is passing up to God, and *He* will hear it. In a little while our opportunity of doing good to our servants will be gone forever. In a little while we shall have done with the artificial distinctions of this world. We shall sleep in the ground, side by side with them, and return to dust as soon as they. In a little while we shall meet them before Christ the Judge, the Great Master of all, with whom there is no respect of persons. He will say to us, ‘These were your servants on earth. They labored for you ten, fifteen, twenty, thirty years. They wore out their lives to supply you with food, raiment, and conveniences, and luxuries of your mortal life. You had them wholly at your disposal. You had my Gospel in your hands. I made you the almoners of my grace to them. Did you remember their never-dying souls?’

“While they communicated to you of temporal things, did you communicate to them of spiritual things? Did you urge and entreat them to come to me, who alone can give the weary and heavy laden rest? Did you allow them to seek my face? Or did you neglect their eternal interests? Did you treat them like the beasts that perish? Were they merely the instruments of your profit or of your pleasures? Did you forget that they were your fellow creatures? Did you forget the price that I paid for their redemption? Did you leave them to perish eternally? Every owner of slaves has an account to render to God for his treatment of them. O! how fearful will be his account, who knowingly and willfully will permit them to go down from his fields, and from his very dwelling, into the bottomless pit, without making a solitary effort to save them? “He that hath ears to hear, let him hear!” (Pastoral letter of Bishop Mead, written in 1834.)

The touching appeal of this venerable man of God met with many a heartfelt response, and Southern Christians and Southern churches have made more effort since that period. The letter in question was reprinted in 1853, by the Convention of Central Virginia, and accompanied by a letter of the Rev. Mr. Frazer, of Charleston, S. C., giving much valuable information in regard to religious effort in behalf of slaves.

But in vain is individual effort, while legislation opposes itself to the instruction and marriages of slaves. Slavery itself is unfavorable to religious sentiment. How few seem to be the daily mercies of the poor slave !

“ Wearily every bosom pineth,
Where the bond of slavery twineth ;
Every flower of life declineth ;
Wearily, oh ! wearily, oh !

The sweet flower of “ hope ” blooms not for him.

The physical hardships of the Southern slave deserve not to be spoken of. It is the tyranny of inhuman laws over their immortal natures which constitutes their chief wrong. Our opinions have been spoken about the instruction of slaves. Let us hear Dr. Bledsoe, whose book is the echo of Southern (political) sentiment on that subject. Alas ! that he who writes so well, should so misuse his pen.

“ This great primordial right ” (the instruction of the poor) is with us denied by law. The slave shall not be taught to read. Oh ! that he might be taught ! What floods of sympathy, what thunderings and lightnings of philanthropy, would then be spared the world ! But why, we ask, should the slave be taught to read ? That he might read the Bible, and feed on the food of eternal life, is the reply ; and the reply is good.

Ah ! If the slave would only read his Bible, and drink its very spirit in, we should rejoice at the change ; for he would be a better and a happier man. He would then know his duty and the high ground on which his duty rests. He would then see, in the words of Dr. Wayland, that “ *The duty of slaves is explicitly made known in the Bible.* ” They are bound to obedience, fidelity, submission, and respect to their masters, not only to the

good and kind, but also to the unkind and froward; not, however, on the ground of duty to man, but on the ground of duty to God."—(Dr. Wayland.)

"But with all," responds Dr. Bledsoe, "we have some little glimpse of our dangers, as well as some little sense of our duties. The tempter is not asleep. His eye is still, as ever of old, fixed on the forbidden tree; and thither he will point his hapless victims. Like certain senators, and demagogues, and doctors of divinity, he will preach from the Declaration of Independence rather than from the Bible. He will teach, not that submission, but that *resistance*, is a duty. To every evil passion his inflammatory and murder instigating appeals will be made. Stung by these appeals, and maddened, the poor African, it is to be feared, would have no better notions of equality and freedom, and no better views of duty to God or man than his teachers themselves have. Such, then, being the state of things, ask us not to prepare the slave for his own utter undoing. Ask us not, O most kind and benevolent Christian! ask us not to lay the train beneath our feet, that you may no longer hold the blazing torch in vain."

So this *refusal to do God's work* proceeds, according to Dr. Bledsoe's own admission, from *the fear of man*, or of the devil—we know not nor care which is meant.

Our reply is, "Fear not them which kill the body, and are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear Him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell." — (Matt. x. 28.)

Dr. Bledsoe concludes this division of his subject — The Arguments of Abolitionists — with a string of invective against them and other advocates of freedom, in the course of which he takes occasion to deride the original bill of rights of the colony of Virginia, which asserted that all men are by nature equally free and independent. The State of Virginia omitted that provision, in presenting her bill of rights to Congress, and Dr. Bledsoe thinks she acted *wisely*. "For, in truth and in deed," says he, "*all men are born absolutely dependent*, and utterly void of freedom. What right, we ask, has the new born infant?" &c. &c.

More logomachy, and continued persistence in the confusion of *right* and *possession*!

Has the heir to an estate, though he be yet a minor, no *right* until his possession begin? What has always been the meaning of the term "*free born*?"

Were our object solely book-making, we should give an extended review of Dr. Bledsoe's argument against the suffrage of free blacks. It will be time enough to do this when slavery shall cease to exist. We are contented with expressing the opinion, that the measures for the abolition of slavery should be such, that slaves should emerge from bondage with a capacity to be useful citizens, which scope includes, of course, the right of suffrage.

The next great division of Dr. Bledsoe's plea for slavery, is

The Argument from the Scriptures.

§ I. *The Argument from the Old Testament.*

Dr. Bledsoe now discusses, on new ground, the proposition of Dr. Wayland, "that Slavery is, *semper et ubique*, morally wrong.

He points to slavery among the Hebrews, and says: "There is an instance in which it was not wrong, because there it received the sanction of the Almighty.

That God did institute slavery among the Hebrews there can be no doubt. Servitude among them was of two kinds; that of the Hebrew servant, for a period of years; and that of the alien, for life. Why, we ask, did God make such ordinances? In reference to the first description of servant—the sale for a period of years is but an apprenticeship, if that be the act of parents during the tender years of their offspring, the object of which is to secure to them from the rich and powerful that sustenance and protection they were unable to give themselves; or it was the voluntary transfer of one's own labor, as in the case of Jacob to Laban, for a certain gage, to be paid during the continuance of the service, or on its completion. That description of servitude is in existence, *passim*, at this day; its equity is undisputed. Alien servants (slaves) were either "bought with money," or were captives in war.

The Israelites were chosen of God to present and uphold before the idolatrous nations of the earth, his attributes and his honor. The idolatrous nations were the Canaanites, under which term were included, the Hivites, the Girgasites, the Amorites, the Jebusites, and other nations doomed by that God who executeth vengeance in his own appointed way, to expiate the impiety of their great ancestor, Canaan. The Moabites and the Ammonites were the children of incest, and exhibited unusual proclivity to the grossest idolatries. God visited on them the sin of Lot, their progenitor. Some of these heathen who knew not God were by his order exterminated by the sword of Joshua, the great type of Jesus the Avenger. Some, by a most undeserved exercise of his mercy, were reserved for the milder doom of bondage; but, from the obligation of masters to introduce their servants to the worship of the true God, and *to compel* that service from them, it requires no extended argument to show that, *to them*, slavery might be the greatest of blessings. The *grant* of their services was coupled with the *duty* of educating them in the knowledge and fear of the true God. How many Southern masters would forfeit their slaves were this tenure acknowledged! In this sense, we would contend, a very large majority of them have no *equitable* claim on the services of their slaves, however the law of the land may invest them with the proprietorship. The States, too, which refuse by any public act to acknowledge the God of Christians, and which by their legislation interpose insuperable barriers to the purest religious education of slaves by giving them the power to read the Gospel, cannot be powers *ordained* of God, but are among those institutions *tolerated* by Him, like many other evils, until the introduction, by His wisdom, of better things.

Agreeing, in the main, then, with Dr. Bledsoe, in the divine ordination of Hebrew slavery, on the evidence of the Pentateuch, we do not feel called on to retrace an argument which is properly presented in his book. We would like to make, for conscience' sake, one exception, in our concurrence with his views of this question. We think that Hebrew slavery

stood on higher ground than even he imputed to it. He puts slavery on the same ground with *polygamy* and divorce, as not *mala in se*; contending that they would "never in that case have been permitted by a holy God, who is of purer eyes than to behold iniquity." As we are threatened with the consecration by law of that evil, in the introduction into the confederacy of the polygamous State of Utah, we must express a little dissent. If but one original pair was created, we cannot resist the conviction, that the first marriages, after that of Adam and Eve, were such (within such degrees of blood-relationship) as were afterwards forbidden of God. Possibly, for the purpose of replenishing the earth more rapidly, polygamy, to some extent, may in the same way have been permitted; though we see no necessity for that, if the number of the sexes were equal.

Abandoning conjecture, let us look at facts.

The first mention of polygamy is that of Lamech, a descendant of Cain, who had two wives, Adah and Zillah. We know no more of him than that, like his great progenitor, he was a *homicide*; and from his addressing his wives on that occasion, there is some ground to conjecture that they were in some way connected with that event, and that it might have arisen out of this improper connection.

Gen. iv. 23, 24. "And Lamech said unto his wives, Adah and Zillah, Hear my voice; ye wives of Lamech, hearken to my speech; for I have slain a man to my wounding, and a young man to my hurt. If Cain shall be avenged seven fold, truly Lamech shall be avenged seventy and seven fold."

Take next the case of Abraham. He was seduced into bigamy by the discontents of his wife Sarah. In this second marriage the Lord did not sanctify Abraham's relation to Hagar. He allowed Sarah to drive her into the wilderness, and did not allow her son Ishmael to inherit with Isaac the "free born." Domestic strife and unhappiness followed the compliance of Abraham. Ishmael was finally banished, and though God made him a great nation, because of being "Abraham's seed," it was a nation which was to subsist for ever by rapine.

The patriarch Isaac appears to have lived happily and blessed of the Lord, as the husband of one wife.

Jacob was beguiled into a double marriage with two sisters, whose jealousies and animosities must have embittered his existence. The record of the ill-regulated passions of Reuben and Judah, and the sanguinary and avaricious dispositions of the other brethren, will afford some ground for conjecturing the feelings with which the Almighty might regard such a family, when the holy duties of wife and mother were converted into subjects of strife and emulation. It seems to us that God intended, in the eventful history of this family, to rebuke polygamy.

As David became great he took to him more wives. The desire to add to their number stained him with the greatest sin of his life, that of "blood-guiltiness;" witness the outpouring of his remorseful and agonized spirit, in the 51st Psalm.

Solomon's many wives led away his heart from God, and consigned, we fear, the wisest of men to eternal death.

It is natural that polygamy should find apologists in those countries where slavery exists. We shall hereafter resume this theme in discussing the morals of slavery.

We subscribe to Dr. Bledsoe's view of the passage in Deut. xxiii. 15, 16, by which it is contended by immediate Abolitionists that Moses meant to abolish slavery. Though this passage forbids the rendition to his master of a fugitive slave, the ground, we think, is justly assumed by the Rev. Moses Stuart, that the description of fugitive slave here alluded to was one who had fled from a gentle master to the Hebrews. His rendition would consign him to pagan idolatry, from which the Mosaic institutes would rescue him.

§ II. *The Argument from the New Testament.*

The abstract theology of the slavery issue, whether or not it comport with the spirit of the Divine Word, has already been to some extent discussed. We do not propose to retread that ground. Our own opinion of the essence of our Saviour's

precept, "Do as ye would be done by," we have already said, is compressed in few words, as far as relates to slavery.

In accordance with that rule, no man could *desire* the possession of a slave, nor be *willing to own a slave*, any longer than the good of that slave might demand—doing in the mean time all that lay in his (the master's) power to fit him for the state of freedom.

"The New Testament," Dr. Wayland remarks, "was given not to one people, but for the whole race; not for one period, but for all time." "Its lessons are, therefore," says Dr. Bledsoe, "of universal and perpetual obligation. If, then, the Almighty has undertaken to enlighten the human race, by degrees, with respect to the great sin of slavery, is it not wonderful that in the very last revelation of his will, he has uttered not a single syllable in disapprobation thereof?" "It must be granted," says Dr. Wayland, "that the New Testament contains no *precept* prohibitory of slavery." "Marvellous," says Dr. Bledsoe, "as such silence must needs be to the Abolitionist, it cannot be more so to him than his attempts to account for it are to others. Let us briefly examine those attempts."

"You may give your child," says Dr. Wayland, "if he were approaching to years of discretion, permission to do an act, while you inculcate upon him principles which forbid it, for the sake of teaching him to be governed by principles rather than by any direct enactment. In such case you would expect him to obey the principle and not avail himself of the permission."

We must here unite with Dr. Bledsoe in condemnation of such ethics. If the act in question were a peccadillo, then it might be supposed that well fortified principles might compensate for the *silence* of the instructor; but if the act involved the commission of a great wrong, there could not consistently be a permission to commit it, concurrent with principles which forbade it.

We do not feel obliged, happily, to resort to that argument. We have one of our own.

If Dr. Bledsoe will contend that, because there is no precept

in the Gospel directed against the institution of slavery, as existing in the Roman Empire in Asia, that therefore there is no precept of the Gospel which condemns such slavery as it exists in the United States, we accept the issue.

Judea was then a Roman province, and slavery was regulated by Roman laws. A slave might be educated. A slave might be manumitted and marry her master's daughter, without offence to public decency. A slave in the Roman provinces, before the anti-Christian persecutions commenced, might profess any religion he pleased, and after that period was no more subject to persecution than the free. During the ministrations of our Saviour on earth, they were equally with the free the objects of his teachings. He desires the ambassadors of John the Baptist to inform him that "unto the *poor* the Gospel was preached." Their education might permit them, in the generation which followed, to read the Epistles, as they were written to the churches. Onesimus, no doubt, read the epistle he conveyed to Philemon, or was made acquainted with its contents. The pupil of the learned Paul was, no doubt, well instructed. It may be said, on the other hand, that the master possessed the power of life and death over the slave. We admit it. And here lies the great distinction between Roman and American slavery. Under Roman laws a few lives might be wantonly sacrificed. Under the laws of our slave States, few souls of those in bondage can be saved.

This makes the grand distinction, in our view. The first is a mere imperiling of the lives; the second destroys the soul. Hence it is, that there *is* a precept of the Gospel which comes into direct collision with American slavery, while of that in Judea it took no cognizance. "*Go ye ! preach the Gospel to all nations, beginning at Jerusalem.*"

Now we maintain, here as we have elsewhere done, that the printed Gospel was God's gift to men, and is the means *now* appointed by him for its most rapid dissemination.

It may be said, in reply, the Gospel is *preached* to the slave, but we are not obliged to read it. We have an easy rejoinder to this quibble.

The word *ευαγγελιζέσθαι* means, "to deliver an agreeable message, *either orally or in writing*," "to evangelize." It has been translated, by a circumlocution, into our tongue, except when later writers have adopted as more appropriate the word "evangelize." Our argument in favor of the printed rather than the spoken Word, particularly for the slave, has been before presented.

We do not find it necessary to blink the question whether Onesimus was a hired or bound domestic, or a slave. We have no doubt on the subject; *δουλος*, the epithet applied to him, always meant either "a slave," or the "subject of a prince who had the power of a *δεσπότης*, or master," that is, the power to take the liberty or life of the subject.

Moreover, the current rendering in the 15th verse, "that thou shouldst receive him *for ever*," is, in our opinion, loose. It has not a spiritual meaning. The words are, "*ἵνα αἱ ὥμιον αὐτοῦ ἀπέχης*" — "that thou shouldst receive him *for his life time*." The word "*αἰωνίος*" never means "eternal," or forever, except when it takes its meaning (being an adjective) from the subject with which it is connected. The word *αἰων* (*ævum*) means, primarily, "a life time," "an age;" and *οἱ αἰῶνες τῶν αἰωνῶν* (ages of ages) is the phrase usually rendered "for ever." Slavery among the barbarous nations where Roman civilization and learning was then spreading, was a necessary evil, in the same sense in which we view it to be such, for a limited time at least, here. The state of slavery itself, moreover, was not so degrading in a country where an insolvent debtor and his family became the slaves of his creditors, and where slaves were frequently manumitted and adopted into patrician families. This interchange of condition, and the possibility that in the various mutations of fortune it might occur, no doubt rendered less definite the line of demarcation. The slave who was a candidate for freedom would endeavor to deport himself like the well born; and the free of the humble classes, at least, would be less disposed to arrogance in their demeanor towards slaves, knowing well that a turn of fortune's wheel might subject themselves to bondage.

The master's power over the life of the slave, was an evil of less magnitude in a semi-barbarous and sanguinary age, where the free citizen, the virtuous, and the powerful, were often subject to the same peril, from the intrigues of faction or the caprice of tyrants.

Roman institutions did not close the portals of knowledge to the slave in the way in which ours do.

Virtue and ability in the slave seldom missed the reward of manumission. There are no such incitements among us. The objection made is the impossibility of amalgamation between the races. Our reply to this is, that practical amalgamation now goes on with greater rapidity than it could do if slavery was abolished. Every generation of slaves is of lighter complexion than the one preceding.

The abolition of slavery would check this immorality. The races would remain longer distinct, for few marriages could be expected between them. Though their political equality might be admitted, the prejudice of color would deny them social equality; and a class would arise not yet well established in our slave States, a class of free laborers exercising handicraft occupations, and willing to accept the position of hired servants.

To resume our discussion, however, from which we have rather digressed, the entrance to the temple of evangelical knowledge is triply barred at present against the slave, by oppressive legislation. Until this shall be repealed, this last great command of our Lord cannot be fulfilled in regard to *them*.

We conclude this chapter, to which we have not thought proper to devote much space, by reiterating our belief that there is a precept of the Gospel which is *expressly* at war with slavery as it exists in the United States.

CHAPTER IV.

DR. Bledsoe's next two chapters we propose briefly to consider in the one which we now commence. He first considers

The Argument from the Public Good.

We would recommend this chapter to the perusal of all immediate Abolitionists. It is a summary of Bigelow's Notes on Jamaica; Carey's Slave Trade, Foreign and Domestic, and several Reports of Parliamentary Committees on the condition of the Colonies in British Guiana and the Mauritius, since the emancipation in 1839.

The facts adduced afford most conclusive evidence that a capacity for citizenship does not at once result from an act of Parliament; that it is misdirected philanthropy which manumits, without careful previous preparation, beings whose natures have not yet been advanced to the proper pitch of civilization.

For the benefit of those into whose hands the work may not fall, or who from lack of sympathy with his opinions on other slavery topics, do not read him, we transcribe some of the most prominent passages.

(From Bigelow's Notes, published in 1850.) "Such are some of the natural resources of this dilapidated and poverty-stricken country." (The allusion is to the island of Jamaica.) "Capable as it is of producing almost everything, and actually producing nothing which might not become a staple with a proper application of capital and skill, its inhabitants are miserably poor, and daily sinking deeper into the utter helplessness of abject want.

"*Magnas inter opes inops.*"

"Shipping has deserted her ports; her magnificent plantations of sugar and coffee are running to weeds; her private dwellings are falling to decay; the comforts and luxuries which belong to industrial prosperity have been cut off, one by one, from her inhabitants; and the day, I think, is at hand when

there, will be none left to represent the wealth, intelligence and hospitality for which the Jamaica planter was once distinguished.

(Bigelow's Notes, quoted by Mr. Carey.) "It is impossible to read Mr. Bigelow's volume without arriving at the conclusion that the freedom granted to the negro has had little effect, except that of enabling him to live at the expense of the planter as long as anything remained. Sixteen years of freedom did not appear to its author to have 'advanced the dignity of labor or of the laboring classes one particle,' while it had ruined the proprietors of the land, and thus great damage had been done to one class without benefit of any kind to the other."

"From a statistical table," Dr. Bledsoe informs us, "published in August, 1853, it appears, says one of our northern journals, that since 1846, 'the number of sugar estates on the island that have been totally abandoned, amounts to one hundred and sixty-eight; and the number partially abandoned, to sixty-three; the value of which two hundred and thirty-one estates was assessed, in 1841, at £1,655,140, or nearly eight millions and a half of dollars. Within the same period, two hundred and twenty-three coffee plantations have been totally and twenty partially abandoned; the assessed value of which was, in 1841, £500,000, or two millions and a half of dollars; and of cattle pens (grazing farms) one hundred and twenty-two have been totally and ten partially abandoned, the value of which was a million and a half of dollars. The aggregate value of these six hundred and six estates, which have been thus ruined and abandoned in the island of Jamaica, within the last seven or eight years, amounted, by the regular assessments, ten years since, to the sum of nearly two and a half millions sterling, or twelve and a half millions of dollars.'"

"The finest land in the world," says Mr. Bigelow, "may be had at any price, and almost for the asking. 'Labor' receives no compensation, and the product of labor does not seem to know how to find the way to market."

(Quoted by Dr. Bledsoe, from "The West Indies and North America, by Robert Baird, A. M.") Mr. Baird says, "That

the British West India colonies have been loudly complaining that they are ruined, is a fact so generally acknowledged that the very loudness and frequency of the complaint has been made a reason for disregarding or undervaluing the grounds of it. That the West Indies are always grumbling, is an observation often heard; and no doubt it is very true that they are so. But let any one who thinks that the extent and clamor of the complaint exceeds the magnitude of the distress which has called it forth, go to the West Indies and judge for himself. Let him see with his own eyes the neglected and abandoned estates, the uncultivated fields, fast hurrying back into a state of nature, with all the speed of tropical luxuriance, the dismantled and silent machinery, the crumbling walls and deserted mansions, which are familiar sights in most of the British West India colonies. Let him then transport himself to the Spanish islands of Porto Rico and Cuba, and witness the life and activity which in these slave colonies prevail. Let him observe for himself the activity of the slaves, the improvements daily making in the cultivation of the fields, and in the processes carried on at the Ingenios, or sugar mills, and *the general indescribable air of thriving and prosperity which surrounds the whole*, and then let him come back to England and say, if he honestly can, that the British West India planters are grumblers, who complain without adequate cause."

The last of three commissions instituted by Parliament to inquire into the condition of British Guiana, (1850,) reported through their chairman, Lord Stanley, a long array of similar facts. We will cite as an example the state of affairs in the Corentyne coast.

"The abandoned plantations on this coast, which, if capital and labor could be procured, might easily be made very productive, are either wholly deserted or are appropriated by hordes of squatters, who, of course, are unable to keep up, at their own expense, the public roads and bridges; and consequently all communications by land between the Corentyne and New Amsterdam are at an end. The roads are impassable for horses or carriages, while for foot passengers they are extremely dan-

gerous. The number of villages in this deserted region must be upwards of 2500, and as the country abounds with fish and game, they have no difficulty in making a subsistence. In fact, the Corentyne coast is fast relapsing into a state of nature."

In connection with some remarks on the "morals of slavery," which we propose appending to this review of Dr. Bledsoe, we shall endeavor to assign the causes of this failure in immediate abolition. Such fruits will always, we think, follow measures so conceived. We can reason, surely, from the past to the future, after ~~no~~ grand an experiment, and so melancholy a disappointment in the result, of the wisest heads and best hearts in the British dominions.

With these facts in view, we do not see how the friend of the slave can desire his *immediate* emancipation. If, in a state of liberty, he is disposed to retrograde into barbarism, let us at least, when we do release him, not give him the excuse of our not having made proper effort to prevent it. We pass by, as a corollary from the last division of the subject, Dr. Bledsoe's *Consequences of Abolition to the South*, and reach that "argument from the public good" which discusses

The Elevation of the Black by Southern Slavery.

"The Abolitionists," remarks Dr. Bledsoe, "with the most singular unanimity, perseveringly assert that Southern slavery degrades its subjects 'into brutes.' This assertion fills us with amazement."

* * * * * "The native African could not be degraded. Of the fifty millions of inhabitants of the continent of Africa, it is estimated that forty millions were slaves. The master had the power of life and death over the slave; and in fact, his slaves were often fed, and killed, and eaten, just as we do with oxen and sheep in this country. Nay, the hind and fore quarters of men, women, and children, might then be seen hung on the shambles and exposed for sale! Then, women were beasts of burden; and, when young, were regarded as a great delicacy by the palates of their pampered masters. A

warrior would sometimes take a score of young females with him to enrich his feasts and regale his appetite. He delighted in such delicacies. As to his religion, it was even worse than his morals; or rather his religion was a mass of the most disgusting immoralities. His notion of a God, and the obscure acts by which that notion is worshipped, are too shocking to be mentioned. The vilest slave that ever breathed the air of a Christian land could not begin to conceive the horrid iniquities of such a life. And yet, in the face of all this, we are told — yea, we are perseveringly and eternally told, that ‘the African has been degraded into a brute by American slavery!’ Indeed, if such creatures ever reach the level of simple brutality at all, is it not evident that they must be elevated, and not degraded to it?”

We will not extend our extracts further. Very little examination into the history of the slave trade, and the perusal of the accounts of recent explorations in Africa, are conclusive to us that this frightful picture faithfully represents Africa as it was, *though not exactly as it now is*.

The colonization of manumitted blacks, imbued with American and European civilization, have aided greatly to effect this result. We are thus disposed to look on American slavery as one of the means, under Providence, for the moral regeneration of Africa.

We consider that Dr. Bledsoe has maintained this last proposition *beyond argument*, and that Southern slavery *has* elevated the black race.

We would go on to inquire — if the hand of Providence be admitted into this page of the history of the race; if by a state of bondage they were designed to be raised from brutes to human beings — whether the master of American slaves, who will acknowledge this, can justify himself *in arresting God's appointed work*, at the point which shall suit his selfish ends? Admitting that slaves are imperfectly civilized, shall not that work go on? Shall not those oppressive legal restrictions be withdrawn which now render it almost a miracle of divine grace that the true light should illuminate spots of this moral wilder-

ness? This will be hereafter discussed in the Appendix to this Review. We shall finish by a few remarks on Dr. Bledsoe's last chapter, which treats of the "*Fugitive Slave Law*."

The only extracts we shall make from this chapter of Dr. Bledsoe's work are his opening and conclusion.

"We have, under our present Union, advanced in prosperity and greatness beyond all former example in the history of nations.

"We no sooner begin to reason from the past to the future, than we are lost in amazement at the prospect before us. We behold the United States, and that, too, at no very distant period, the first power among the nations of the earth. But such reasoning is not always to be relied on. Whether, in the present instance, it points to a reality, or to a magnificent dream merely, will of course depend on the wisdom, integrity, and moderation of our rulers. It cannot be disguised that the Union, with all its unspeakable advantages and blessings, is in danger. It is the Fugitive Slave Law against which the waves of Abolitionism have dashed with their utmost force, and raged with almost boundless fury. On the other hand, it is the Fugitive Slave Law — that great constitutional guarantee of our rights — which the people of the South are, as one man, the most inflexibly resolved to maintain. We are prepared, and shall accordingly proceed to show, that in this fearful conflict, the great leaders of Abolitionism — the Chases, the Sewards, and the Sumners of the day — are waging a fierce, bitter, and relentless warfare against the Constitution of their country."

This exordium is followed by charges, against Mr. Seward, Mr. Sumner, and Mr. Chase, of attacks on the Constitution. Presuming that these charges have already been answered by the parties accused, or that they will be, we proceed to give our own view of this law, and the duty of moderate, patriotic, and conservative citizens, whether pro-slavery advocates or emancipationists, in the emergency. We shall briefly state what we believe to be facts, and draw our own conclusions, without regard to the censure or approbation of ultraists among either.

1. Slavery existed in all the thirteen original States. Hence

we view the opening clause of the Declaration of Independence, as but an abstract declaration of equal rights, on the part of all whose mental and moral capacity fitted them for their enjoyment. It could not be taken as the expression of any determination to abolish slavery immediately, for such a determination would not have been so feebly expressed in an instrument of such nervous vigor and lucidity.

It could not *but* be considered as an expression of sentiment on the part of the signers and those whom they represented, that it *ought* to be abolished, wherever and whenever it could safely be done. The opinions of Thomas Jefferson — the acknowledged author of that instrument — forbid the idea that he intended such a paradox as the "Declaration" and a persistence in the slavery system must exhibit.

That noble document exhibited to a wondering world the resolution of the self-sacrificing signers, that on this soil freedom in its most perfect form should find a citadel and home. Here was her standard boldly planted. Despotism, it was declared, should find no foot of soil on which to plant his iron heel. Not royal George alone, but kindred tyrants, and champions of privilege, beheld in this little piece of paper, "the cloud not bigger than a man's hand," which precluded the coming tempest, beneath whose sweeping crash, thrones, principalities and powers should fall like the ripe grain before the harvest thunder-storm.

At the glad news that here, in this new and glorious hemisphere, the fiat had gone forth, which should forever check the pride of kings and tyrant nobles, young freedom plumed her pinions for a wider flight, the scourged and wasted victims of political oppression ceased for a moment to feel the galling of their chains, hope dawned in the cell of the captive and the cabin of the slave.

If now — amidst that patriot band whose hearts were then throbbing with just indignation and resentment at their own wrongs — some cold and calculating politician had here arisen, and expressed dissent from the general character of the proposition in freedom's favor — some special reservation of opinion in regard to the unfortunate race which Providence had made

"our money" — we think the cold suggestion would have fallen among that assembly of ardent and philanthropic spirits, like the frozen icicle into the molten furnace. With one angry hiss, it would have disappeared forever. The different members of the new confederacy were interested to a very different extent in the institution of slavery. Hence, in determining what powers should be ceded to the National government, it seemed expedient to leave that, as well as all other questions for the protection of persons and property, to the State governments. It was also evident that in opposite proportion to the degree with which this institution was interwoven with the interests of property, would be the adoption of measures to carry out the great *cardinal* principle of the declaration, by the abolition of slavery; that some States would necessarily be leaders in this work. When free States should exist, troubles might arise from their becoming places of refuge for fugitives.

The men who formed the Federal Constitution were wise as well as patriotic. The Sun of freedom, they were well aware, must struggle to his meridian through thronging clouds. The light which culminates with rocket speed must terminate in speedy darkness.

To anticipate such conflicts of jurisdiction as might arise between slave and free communities, it was provided in the Constitution, that "no person held to labor or service in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall in consequence of any law therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due."

Under this clause of the Constitution the acts of 1793 and 1850 were passed, for the "Rendition of Slaves."

Seven of the original slave States had, before the passage of the last act, abolished slavery; and nine new States had arisen, in which slavery was not recognized. The number of the slave States has increased to fifteen.

Movements had commenced in some of the slave States in favor of manumission; and almost simultaneously, efforts on the part of the free States to abolish slavery in the District and

effect its exclusion from the Territories. An overflowing slave population in some of the States was provided with an escape valve in the deportation of slaves to new States as they might arise. The success of the Northern agitation would have the effect of diminishing the value of slave property. To counteract this influence Texas had been summarily annexed to the United States, in the administration of Mr. Tyler.

The recognition, then, of slavery, under the old Spanish laws, gave rise to the expectation that it would be extended over the whole of the new State or as many States as might be formed out of it. By the application of the preëxisting Missouri compromise to the new acquisition, 36° 30' north latitude was made the Northern boundary of Slavery, it being provided that four new States might be formed out of Texas in which slavery *might* exist, and four States from which, by the resolutions for the annexation of Texas, it was to be *forever* excluded. (See speech at St. Louis, of Hon. T. H. Benton, June, 1856.) In the Congressional session of 1853-4, a bill was introduced by the Hon. Stephen A. Douglas, for the organization of the new Territories of Kansas and Nebraska.

This bill proposed to repeal the Missouri compromise, and leave the question of "slavery or "no slavery" for the decision of the inhabitants of the new States when they should be formed. This was well understood to be a bribe proffered by Judge Douglas for Southern votes in the next Presidential campaign. Coming from a Northern man, the South pretended to consider it a Northern measure, and they were consequently absolved from any further support of the Missouri compromise.

The very States which had voted for that measure aided to carry the Kansas-Nebraska bill, by which the whole slavery agitation has been reëopened and the country brought to the verge of ruin. Prior to that act, a peaceful calm had settled over this vexed question, and sectional animosities had been buried in the deep waters of oblivion.

The Douglas bill disturbed this serenity as effectually as the sudden flash which fires the quiet cottage in the still hours of night, rouses its sleeping tenants. The Fugitive Slave Law of

1850, the propriety and legality of which we are now considering, had experienced great opposition — often from the honest prejudices of those whose ignorance prevented their recognizing a necessity for any such law — but more from the bitterness of fanatics and political Abolitionists.

The question is now of a political character. Though the *status in quo* of the Kansas-Nebraska question cannot be re-established, some hope may exist of settling this question in the territories themselves, by the ballot-box. Our own belief — our hope we may say — is, that *practically*, the Douglas bill may disappoint its supporters as it already has the projector, in the only portion of its working in which he could have an interest.

If we shall survive that epoch, the settlement of the boundaries of slavery will cause excitement to subside. Texas affords ample space for the absorption of the natural increase. Each successive generation will approach the dominant race in complexion as well as in civilization, and with the disappearance of distinction in the color of the skin, must also disappear all such objections as have thus far been made on the score of inferiority. The slave will no longer, but in a very remote degree, be of different blood from the free. Indigenous free labor will then be found more profitable than slave labor, and slavery will naturally be abandoned. This may seem a strange prediction. Our Appendix, we hope, will throw some light on the subject.

The circumscription of the limits of slavery will cause the present morbid sentiment “that slavery is a blessing,” to be less openly professed. No man whose heart is right can believe it, and we are happy to say that very few of our acquaintances believe it.

The laws for the rendition of slaves were guaranteed by the Constitution, and it was the duty of Congress to pass them. Their constitutionality has been established by the Supreme judiciaries of the United States and of New York.

Opposed as we ourselves are to slavery, we still hold it to be the duty of all citizens to make no opposition to their execution, though they may conscientiously, we think, if not called on as public functionaries, decline to aid in their enforcement.

When external agitation ceases and fugitive slaves are suffered to be remanded, then, and then only, we think, can a system of gradual emancipation, founded on laws for the improvement of the black race, be resumed.

When the question ceases to be political, and is one only of philanthropy, the mouth of the dumb will be opened, and the deaf ear unstopped.

We cannot conclude this portion of our subject better than in the language of Dr. Bledsoe. "We have a right to peace, under the decisions of that august tribunal (the Supreme Court of the United States.) It is neither right nor proper — it is contrary to every principal of natural justice — that either party to this great contest should decide for itself. Hence if the Abolitionists will not submit to the decisions of the Supreme Court, we shall most assuredly refuse to submit to their arrogant dictation. We can from our inmost hearts respect the feelings of those of our Northern brethren who may choose to remain passive in this matter, and leave us, by such aid as the law may afford, to reclaim our fugitives from labor. For such we have only words of kindness and feelings of fraternal love."

The concluding language is denunciatory of those with whom we, as well as the writer, differ in opinion as to the obligations of the Constitution on public men.

In pursuance, however, of our desire to heal rather than to widen this breach between the two sections of our once happy country, we forbear to attribute the worst motives to our opponents. We think they are in error, and hope that time may bring to them conviction.

We disagree with Dr. Bledsoe in much of his reasoning, but concur with him here. Freedom, in its most liberal sense, has zealous friends in the South, who are equal to the work, *and will accomplish it if let alone.*

If in the preceding discussion we have failed to show the fallacy of Dr. Bledsoe's position, "that the state of bondage is most conducive to the happiness and welfare of the black race," we will endeavor to strengthen our argument against slavery by submitting our own observations of its effects on the morals,

industry, and general economy of the white race. These will be found in our Appendix.

With our thanks to those readers, either Northern or Southern, whose patience or candor has enabled them to follow us through the dry discussion, we, for the present, take leave of Dr. Bledsoe's book.

A P P E N D I X.

WHAT we have to say in regard to Southern institutions, is designed to show our Northern friends that the evils they deplore, and which it is our purpose truly to describe, may be to them subjects of regret, but will be more promptly and certainly remedied by their forbearance, than they can ever be by their active interference.

Moral Influences of Slavery in the South.

§ I. *Influence of Slavery on the General Character of the White Population.*

Our own observations on human character in general, as well as those extending through a long period, on the distinctive traits in the manners and morals of the inhabitants of the free and slave States, have established in our minds a proposition, not new in character, but greatly overlooked, which we now purpose making the basis of our remarks on slavery and its influences. On the strength of this proposition, if we shall succeed in establishing in other minds the convictions we entertain, we shall claim from both sections of our country more forbearance, more respect for each other's motives, and a greater disposition to bear each other's burthens.

National character is influenced by several causes. Of these, the first is the character which we inherit from our ancestors, and which may measurably be preserved even under adverse influences, by a traditionary education and persistence in their customs. The second influence is that of climate and physical geography, inducing necessarily other modes of life, either de-

veloping energies before dormant, or extinguishing those once possessed. Lastly, the influence of State policy, or of any peculiar institutions, which produce, insensibly and unavoidably, great modifications, both of the inward and outward man.

Descending from a common stock, the two sections of this country possessed, originally, one character. Our endeavor shall be to explain under what influences they have become diverse; and proving, as we hope to do, that under an exchange of circumstances, each would be what the other is now, we would urge the reasonable and conservative on either side to the adoption of moderate and conciliatory measures.

Slavery was introduced very early in the settlement of both the Northern and Southern colonies of America. The African did not, however, find a congenial climate in the North. Less able to bear the inclemency of Northern winters, he gave less efficient assistance to the hardy settlers of that region.

Blacks always succumb to severe cold sooner than whites. Natives, too, of a region where Nature's bounties call for little toil, they are in disposition indolent, and less fitted to wring subsistence from a soil so sterile as that of the Northern seaboard settlements. The bracing climate, more congenial to the sons of Britain, but stimulated their efforts to subdue the soil, the savage, and the forest.

Like a misplaced exotic, Northern slavery never throve, and has very naturally given way to the labor of European emigrants.

Slaves were introduced into Virginia by Dutch traffickers, at a period almost coëval with its settlement, but not in large numbers. It subsequently became the policy of the British crown to encourage the importation of slaves. One consequence of this error has been to leave some doubt upon the problem whether white labor is adapted to a latitude so far South. We have no doubt on this head, however, and propose in the proper place to advance our views.

In the South, the relative positions of white and black in capacity to endure the climate, were reversed. Unaccustomed to solar heat, the laboring white soon experienced its enervat-

ing influence; and on the introduction of slavery found ready satisfaction in the aid of a class of laborers, who basked with delight in the sun's meridian rays.

The Southern master, too, was less exacting in his demands on the labor of his servant, being unwilling to overtask so useful a coadjutor, whose toils permitted in himself a state of nearly absolute leisure. A soil more kindly, which yielded an abundant harvest to the most imperfect cultivation, the lavish bounties of nature in the products of the river and the sea, peopled with their winged and finny tribes and their various testaceous products, demanded but little toil for mere subsistence. Here the sable race found a home more consonant with their physical nature, as well as circumstances more favorable to their natural indolence. Thus, the tyrannical influence of the Southern sun, and the little toil absolutely requisite to procure the comforts and many of the luxuries of life, combining with the existence of an indolent class of laborers, sapped the native energy of the white settler. Slavery may at one period have been a system of hard exaction from the toiling black, but it certainly is not so at this time. They are a slow-moving race, and the available product of their toils always falls far below that of a white of ordinary industry, even in the South.

Large grants of land to favorites of the crown begot an American order of nobility, if we may so say. Before the American Revolution, estates were principalities; and though the rights of primogeniture transmitted them undiminished to the eldest son, still the great abundance of new and fertile lands easily portioned off the younger scions.

The slave trade continued to supply tillers of the soil. The class of yeomanry, or small proprietors, common in England, was nearly unrepresented. The most ordinary household and farming utensils were of colonial fabric; but all manufactured goods were imported from the mother country. There thus existed an impassable gulf of separation between the lordly proprietor and the half-brutal slaves on his estates. The prestige of wealth and superior social position, kept at an humble

distance whites of the inferior class. Small farmers and emigrant artisans preferred the Apalachian vallies, where slave labor was not yet introduced, and where their humble toils would be more respected. These forest tamers, who at first disputed with the lurking savage the right to till their fields, were the founders of another race of large proprietors. They bequeathed to their descendants large estates achieved by letters patent from the crown, but of which the possession had yet to be contested with the aid of the axe and the rifle.

These iron men were among the heroes of King's Mountain and other hard fought fields of the time that tried men's metal. Slavery among them never made much progress. The labor of the slave was not necessary to them. They inherited strong arms, resolute hearts, and simple tastes. Their own self-reliant natures scorned the luxurious ease of slavery. The invigorating air they breathed made toil and danger but a pastime.

Between the sea-coast and the mountains, slave labor became fully naturalized. The time not necessarily devoted to the supervision of their estates, was occupied by the proprietary class in the interchange of hospitalities and the ordinary amusements of the English gentry. In no other portion of the United States, at this time even, a recent foreign tourist has informed us, are the *class* of English country gentry represented.

The courtesy of manner in both the sexes, the aristocratic bearing and chivalrous spirit of the ruder sex, and graceful indolence of the gentler, have survived the institutions which gave occasion to them. The repeal, since the Revolution, of the laws of entail, of primogeniture, and of escheat, have shattered and subdivided the large estates. No more new and fertile tracts lie open to the entry of the unportioned or of the too numerous progeny of wealthy sires. Subsistence must now be striven for with will resolved, with patient toil, amidst jostling competition, too often of coarse and ignoble spirits, to whom the refinements of life had never been known; but to whom, still, as well as to the well born, the avenue to success is open; and with whom, however reluctantly, the prize of eminence must be contested.

Such a class as the last mentioned have at length effected a footing in Southern society. In a country where but one distinction is even now acknowledged, (that of the free and the slave,) the uneducated son of the overseer is peer, at the country gathering, to his employer's son; the first having achieved his small estate by his own toil; the latter having received his in the division of his paternal acres.

Both, perhaps, are proprietors of slaves; and this possession authorizes the vulgar *parvenu*, in his own opinion, to assume the tone and bearing, which, though tolerable if not excusable in the far descended aristocrat and man of education and refinement, is but an ill fitting garment on the former.

Hence the vulgar hilarity which distinguishes, elsewhere, the clown from the man of refined manners, is not observable, to any great extent, in the South. A decorous gravity and courtliness distinguishes the Southern gentleman; and those who do not get their characteristics as an inheritance, acquire them by attrition, as it were, or affect their possession.

Far be it from us to condemn in unmitigated terms as evil, any institution which exhibits so pleasant a compensation as the almost universal courtesy of the people—the low as well as the high. On the surface of society, low-breeding is not observable.

The most conspicuous quality of Southern people is their politeness, which we must ascribe to slavery.

In a region whose chief pursuit is agriculture, the products of labor are sold but once a year. Unlike the traffic in small wares, the man of the South receives his revenues but once or twice a year. Cereals are sold in the fall, cotton and tobacco in the spring.

Periodical receipts necessitate periodical payments; and credit takes the place of cash payments, in all the affairs of life. This opens the door to unthrift. "Borrowing," says Shakspeare, "dulls the edge of husbandry." Credit is nothing else.

Every member of a Southern family is educated in the practice of this system. Pay day is so remote that no present

inconvenience is felt, and no restriction is ordinarily placed on a custom which, while it educates them in wasteful ways, still makes young hearts happy. The parent cannot commence a reform which, however necessary in his case, he has not been taught to practice. Settling-day sometimes produces long visages; but credit, like the ready "slave of the lamp," removes all embarrassment. He resolves to be more frugal for the next six months, and forgets it in a week.

It is not to be supposed that he who thus habitually feels no want of money, while he indulges every taste, should condescend to pettiness in trade. The hospitality, which was once the recreation and delight of the wealthy proprietor, is continued from mere habit and disregard of the future by his needy descendant. Liberality is another pleasant Southern virtue, resulting from that very slavery on which the credit system rests—pleasant to the taste, but bitter in the digestion, as we may presently see. Even the Southern merchant, accustomed as he is to the credit system, is superior to pettiness in settlements. He, too, is liberal and courteous. His profits are, no doubt, designed to cover his losses; but, from the frequent failures of Southern merchants, it would appear not to be so. The Northern dealer who furnishes his goods, in arranging his own profits, must have an eye to Southern failures. All this tends to raise the price to the consumer, and to send away from the South large sums, which, under a more frugal system, might afford the means of prosecuting schemes of philanthropy and public utility which now are only talked of.

Domestic Discipline.—As the children of one generation are the men of the succeeding one, we may be allowed, with Solomon, to augur the growth of the tree from the distortion of the twig.

Let us inquire, what are every where the instruments of discipline? We shall be answered, "the fear of punishment, and the hope of reward." What rewards can be in prospect for the youth or maiden, to whom habitual indulgence and the unfailing resort to credit present a prompt gratification of every

wish. Though Solomon has told us, "Chasten thy son sometimes, and spare not for his crying," the Southern parent disdains resort to the rod — that discipline of slaves!

Were there no slaves in Solomon's time?

The melancholy truth is that Southern youth, especially of the male sex, are equally removed from both motives for submission. Nothing seems to be claimed from them, except a certain measure of *outward* respect to parents. In this, it must be admitted, they are seldom deficient.

The Southern boy as quietly and respectfully puts by any effort at parental control, as a polite and adroit "*maitre d'armes*" would your thrust of a foil in the "*salon*."

He places himself at the school he likes best, selects himself the subjects of his studies, changes when he lists, and announces to the young man his father when it is his pleasure to exchange the school-bench for the college. He assumes the *toga virilis* when he can be persuaded by a tailor or his glass that it will become him. At the age when the youth of other countries are amused by kites or marbles, he is indulged with pointers, guns, and horses.

What degree of proficiency can be made by such youth, will be seen when we come to speak of education.

The same unfettered precocity distinguishes the other sex. The young ladies of the South are well-bred and graceful. Their education is superficial, a fault by no means, we think, confined to Southern Female Seminaries.

They run through, nominally, a catalogue of languages, sciences, and accomplishments, to be forgotten as soon as learned, if ever learned at all, or not to be used if retained. The only things well learned and carefully preserved, are the marriage baits, music and dancing.

The Southern female, except in the humblest sphere, has no duties until after marriage. Though conspicuously trifling as a girl, she is exemplary as a matron. In no country are the duties of wife and mother more faithfully and gracefully discharged. To the moral and religious instruction of Southern mothers, is due much of what is excellent in Southern character.

The moral purity of Southern females, arises from a feature in their education peculiar to the South. Young ladies are not always subject to the contaminating influences of boarding schools. Parents who have the means indulge themselves with governesses for their children, and sustain in part the expense by admitting a few pupils as boarders. In these family schools, of which the real heads are ladies and gentlemen, and which are distinguished by decorum of manners and exemption from coarse and corrupting influences of large schools, are formed the characters of Southern ladies. Here they silently learn from the mistress of the mansion, the deportment of ladies, and those household duties (in theory) for the practice of which they show themselves better fitted than the young lady who has been finished in a fashionable seminary.

These last exist, too, at the South; but it is to be apprehended that, here, as elsewhere, they do not produce the most useful members of society.

In the same way as the courtesy of the Southern gentleman is reflected in the manners of men of low degree, the demeanor of the ladies is copied by those who have not had their advantages. Whoever has been entertained, even in a cottage in one of the slave regions, must be struck with the faultless propriety with which the female who presides at table dispenses her hospitalities, as well as the active freedom from *mauvaise honte*. Invested with the dignity of freedom, she does no mean homage to the adventitious distinction of wealth. Such is the human heart, that too often our own self-exalting thoughts have no better foundation than the comparative degradation of others. It is this broad equality in the white race, which gives such tenacious hold to democracy in the South. There is no shouldering of the rich man by the radical, and little oppression of the poor by the rich, no jarring of castes. In the common enjoyment of the great boon of freedom, they seem resolved to consider all other distinctions of too little importance to be matters of heart-burning and envy.

The discipline of domestics is somewhat better. They are not absolutely allowed to work as little as they may please,

but they are never overworked, except by the *parvenu* proprietor.

The humanizing influences of education, and the ancient family ties between master and servant, temper, in the hereditary slaveholder, the greed of gain which is the cardinal trait of the "new man." The most successful farmers and planters are these last, who are gradually taking the place of the former lords of the soil. Their slaves are governed with strictness — often with severity — but not oftener with cruelty than bound servants and apprentices in free communities.

Southern slaves must be emancipated from hereditary indolence, before they can earn themselves a subsistence under free institutions. An improved agriculture has introduced more activity and method into slave labor, within the last twenty years, from which good results may be predicted, to both master and slave. Slavery in the South is eminently, as far as the physical condition is concerned, a mild institution. Very light toil does not, we think, merit delicate food, such as covers the tables of the rich in all countries. Slaves are coarsely but abundantly fed. A very large proportion of the corn and bacon of every plantation is consumed by them; as Morton, of Milwood, remarked, "the carles and the cart avers make it all, and the carles and cart avers eat it all." Their toil is for their own subsistence. A failure in the crop does not subject them to the risk of starvation. The master must buy food. Repeated failures or mismanagement, which bring ruin on the proprietor, effect no change in the condition of his slaves, in that respect. They become the property of other masters, who are able to provide their raiment and subsistence.

They are thus exempt from all the corroding anxieties in regard to present and future subsistence, to which the state of free laborers is liable. Labor and capital are not here engaged in the perpetual strife with each other which free communities present. There is, consequently, between most masters and their servants, something like a community of interests; an alliance, instead of the antagonism which marks the intercourse of laborer and employer in free States. The slave does

not tremble before his master, as very often we know the poor artizan must do before the grinding capitalist.

Every one who has had full opportunity to *study* their condition, and whose opinions are not derived from transient visits to slave States and hearsay testimony, must give the verdict that both in physical condition and entire freedom from care, no laboring class in the world are to be compared to Southern slaves. Those cares which leave their traces in deep wrinkles on the countenances of the white race, never beset the black. The smoothness of their skins makes it exceedingly difficult to pronounce upon their ages. They are often, it is true, crippled in old age with rheumatism, which is not the consequence of exposure, but of incapacity to bear cold. In all their field labors for one-half of the year, fires are kindled in the fields to warm their chilly fingers. This is the pleasant side of their condition.

We now come to the melancholy obverse. Though populous free cities, like New York and Philadelphia, present great gulfs of vice, being the recipients of the raff and scum from the seething cauldrons of Europe, drawing often into their vortices, like the maelstrom of the geographies, things good in themselves, to be ejected in wrecks in parts remote, these evil influences are counterpoised by more combined and persistent effort in the cause of religion and humanity than can possibly be made in rural districts. These large cities are the battle ground where Satan is encountered by noble humanitarians and servants of God, with a zeal which cannot fail of its reward. Where vice abounds, Christian charity does equally abound; and we can hardly suppose so good a tree to bear no fruit. At least no legislative enactments are adverse to the progress of morality and religion.

Under Southern laws slave marriages are not recognized. Slaves to the *soil*, like Russian serfs, may enjoy without molestation the sacred pleasures of domestic life. They have, in some degree, a property in the soil they till, and from which they cannot be torn. Here the ties of nature are matured and respected as among the free.

The nature of Southern slavery permits and compels the frequent rupture of those ties; hence they are little regarded. Want of tenderness towards their offspring is a characteristic of slave parents. They correct them with little provocation, and with an unsparing cruelty which often calls for interference from their masters. Among those to whom marriage is not legal, chastity ceases to be a virtue. It is, in fact, almost wholly unknown to the female slave, and the corrupting influence of this vice on the youthful freeman may well be imagined.

In other regions libertinism is the fungous growth of cities and towns. In the South, the moral cancer pervades as well the rural districts as the most populous, the crowded city and the isolated mansion. If this pestilence could find its limits in the age when youthful indiscretion and folly are allowed elsewhere to be apologies for vice, the consequences would not be so fearful. But how often do we find this evil seed taking deep root and flourishing amid the sanctities of married life, poisoning all tender charities beneath its baneful shade! The hoary rake and veteran corrupter of youth, by his example, unblushing shows his face even where his illicit offspring are known. Such is the great prevalence of this immorality, that he is thought a prude in virtue, who shall condemn the "good-man" who has no other vice. Society winks at such delinquencies; and sorrowing mothers and injured wives cover up the wrongs which, like the Spartan fox, if they have any sensibilities, must eat into their vitals.

It may be remarked, by some champion *à l'outrance* of everything Southern, that libertinism is not the peculiar vice of slave countries. We concede the vice to several in Northern communities, but only among the depraved rich or vicious poor. Among the masses of the better class, and throughout the middle class, it is discountenanced.

It will not admit of argument, we think, that in a country where all females of the inferior class are unchaste, where marriage is not recognized among them, and their honor, if they chance to possess any, is not under the protection of law, and scarcely under that of public opinion, that this vice must natur-

ally be expected to prevail to an extent which can never be known when female honor is under the double protection of laws and juries, and of fathers, husbands, and brothers. We do not believe any man will be so uncandid as to deny this. He claims too much for any country who would assert that its youth were proof against such temptations, and against such complete impunity.

Southern laws forbid the education of the slave. To him the Bible is a fountain of joy forever closed. The glad tidings of salvation are conveyed to his benighted mind in modes so desultory, and streams so diluted and often vitiated, that they afford him sustenance as unsatisfying to his immortal nature, as are the odors from his master's kitchen to his physical frame. Though one of the evangelical churches has hastily admitted numbers of them to membership, it is well known that some of the most vicious slaves are among them. They look on the application of water as a plenary absolution for all past offences, and as ample an indulgence for those which may be committed hereafter. Marriage obligations are as little regarded among them as among other slaves, and pilfering and disregard of truth as are common as among the unprofessing. Those who are gathered into city congregations and hear weekly Gospel preaching, may be considered exceptions to these remarks. We think we know among such, many instances of lowly and genuine piety, sufficient to demonstrate to us that the degraded black may be regenerated. We resume the discussion of his character.

Slaves are liars; we might almost assert the converse. More adroit liars than Southern slaves we have never met with. The lie malign, the lie exculpatory, the lie facetious, and the lie unnecessary, are their meat, drink, and pastime.

Thus truth, honesty, chastity, are virtues unknown among them; and the precepts commanding their observance they regard as little as the tintinnabulary music with which they would decoy a hive of bees.

All these dark and perverted views of moral and religious duty, are the unavoidable concomitants of oppressive legislation. Its mandate forbids the eradication of these moral poisons; and in default of the permission to instruct, slavery re-

mains forever as it now is. We have no faith in the philanthropy which forbids the Bible to the slave.

Education.—Our next theme is education. The Southern mind is naturally of a high order, adapted to the acquisition of all knowledge which may be attained by meditation and the study of men, unable to subject itself to the drudgery of schools; to the unremitting toils which make the memory a repository of facts on which the more mature judgment may act. To this national indolence, which is the legitimate fruit of slavery, there are numerous exceptions.

The State where these remarks are penned (Virginia) possesses a corps of professors and teachers, mostly natives and bred in her own institutions, whose equals for solidity and extent of learning it would be difficult to find.

Of this we shall say more hereafter.

Learning was aptly exemplified by Æsop, in the fable of the Thirsting Crow, too familiar to need more than mention. It is the accumulation of a series of efforts on the part of its votary; and he who is without patient industry, may look with longing eyes on the treasures of science, but he will never grasp them. Among the various motives to human learning, the noblest is the love of knowledge for its own sake. A craving curiosity for knowledge manifests itself, more or less, in all young children. If this faculty be properly directed, and associated with persevering effort, a man is formed — one of those who constitute a nation's most imperishable wealth.

This faculty, more useful to society, perhaps, than any other, is possessed with various degrees of intensity by different individuals. It may be combined with other traits unfavorable to its development; the tares will outgrow the wheat unless eradicated by some fostering hand. There are natures, however, whose towering aspirations towards the intellectual empyrean no neglect can discourage, no obstacles check; as noble pines erect their summits mid sterile cliffs and clinging brambles, to furnish in their maturity materials for the use, security, and adornment of society. No clime, happily, possesses a monopoly of such men; wherever they may be born, the world

claims them as citizens and benefactors. The light of learning has glanced even from the icy cliffs of Lapland; and beamed in days long past with more intensity from the burning deserts of Africa. The brotherhood of science, united in the pursuit of a common object, the welfare of their kind, are undissevered by time or distance, by political divisions or natural animosities. Like seed time and harvest, their useful toils go on to accomplish their beneficent mission amid the jarrings of human passion, the disappointments of human hopes.

Though the true disciples of learning may not be indifferent to the world's applause, few of them make that the goal towards which they strive. That inferior end may sometimes be attained, from the confined circle which may preclude a comparison of one's self with those in other spheres, and from the absence of any high standard of attainment.

"A substitute will shine as brightly as a king,
Until a king be by."

A limited ambition, which desires not to increase the sum of the world's knowledge, may be satisfied with small acquisitions. He who runs amidst a crowd of laggards is often contented not to be the hindmost.

Another spur to study is necessity. The son of the poor and hard-working mechanic, if he can enjoy the privilege of opportunity, with the wholesome knowledge that such opportunity is transient, will put forth his best efforts, and win the prize from the more sluggish sons of wealthier sires. Pleasure beckons the child of blind indulgence from the "stony path" into her flowery realms. Intoxicated by the odors of her ready censer, he takes from her extended hand the blushing fruit, whose taste, like that of the brilliant manchineel, is death.

Can it be wondered, that, where parental control is relaxed or abandoned, where neither rewards or punishments can be motives for exertion, where a mediocrity, above which few care to rise, is all the eminence usually striven for, where the pinchings of necessity do not impel to exertion, and where all the pleas-

ures and amusements which are suited to youth, as well as many which are not suited, are permitted or encouraged; can it be wondered, we say, that in the absence of all customary motive to exertion, the youth of the South should not be disposed to patient unrelaxing study? to the diligence which only can secure either a solid basis or an elegant superstructure of the temple of science?

Teachers of elementary schools in the South are neither incompetent nor unfaithful; but they are forced, by the usages of society and the entire absence of coöperation on the part of parents, to abandon as impracticable all methods of compelling diligence in pupils, which have wrought well elsewhere. The Southern boy has not the industry to commit to memory, and there are no means available to compel him to do so. Teachers are compelled to abandon their vocations or admit defective recitations. They compromise with conscience by the reflection that other teachers have no better success, and that the patrons of schools are in fault, not the teachers.

Imperfection thus characterizes the earliest germs of youthful effort in Southern schools; the worm at the root robs the growing plant of healthfulness. Orthography is never well learned, and, tell it not in Gath! but very few years have elapsed since students who had been admitted into the academic classes at the University of Virginia, were refused graduation in ancient languages because of ignorance of the vernacular. The occasion of this is a radical error in the mode of instruction. The sheer impossibility of compelling youth to commit the dry paradigms of English Grammar, has given occasion to a "royal road," by which that necessity, it is agreed, may be dispensed with. This is no less than dispensing with the study of English Grammar altogether. Grammar, these philosophers declare, is a general science. Hence languages, they say, may be learned in groups, by the application of this general science. The study of the Latin language is thus commenced by boys who know not even their accidence in English, of whom the task of memorizing has never been exacted, and who have now to learn both languages at once.

This appears to our dull faculties something like attempting to measure without a rule. A pupil cannot translate a Latin tense into the proper one in English, for he does not know the English tense; neither can he see how the Latin subjunctive may be rendered into English, sometimes by an imperative, sometimes by a conditional; he has never before heard of moods. A remedy for this, it is asserted, may be found in the committing to memory of the parallel columns in English and Latin. This is generally found, in *practice*, to be too Herculean a task for the boy who had never before been made to commit *anything* to memory. He is therefore allowed by the teacher to recite the contents of the Latin columns only. If he succeeds in doing this correctly—which is hardly probable—he has possessed himself of a magazine of weapons he is unable to wield.

He is consequently obliged to resort to translations and English notes, in the progress of his studies—a most happy relief, too, to his teacher. In truth, this mode of teaching languages can only apply to mature understandings and a resolute determination to shun no difficulties in the task. Indeed, to such a student it is no task; it is a pleasure! He sees beyond the present to the application of his toils, while the poor boy sees nothing but the hated load he is compelled to draw. His visions are of tops and marbles; or, if he has reached the mature age of fourteen, of pointers, horses, guns.

It may be that the system is inseparably connected with the indulgence common in slave countries. In regions more favorable to the development of industry, by the sole exercise of that virtue, and of the facility which youth possesses in the highest perfection—the faculty of memory—all the rudiments of a good English education may have been acquired at the age when Southern youth commence to study Latin, and when they have yet learned absolutely nothing.

There is in Virginia a body of teachers who are alumni of the University. Such of these as have boarding schools, and have the reins of discipline in their own hands, have done much to elevate the standard of classical learning there. But in vain

do accomplished teachers and able professors at the University endeavor to make head against the prevailing indolence. Those who are curious with regard to Southern education are referred to a series of articles published recently in the Southern Literary Messenger. The subject is the University, and the object is to show that notwithstanding the great and acknowledged ability of the Academic Professors, the standard in classical learning is not what it should be in a University.

The University is but partially endowed, each of the Professors receiving \$1000 from the State. The remaining compensation must be from the fees paid by students, or, as it is called, from "the ticket," each professor being allowed the proceeds of his own ticket, within a maximum of \$3000. There being no preliminary examination, and the prestige of University study being flattering to the pride of youth, the number of students has been steadily increasing, until, in the past scholastic year, it was 550, and now exceeds 600.

The acknowledged principle of "Election of Study," enabled pretentious youths to enjoy for a while the éclat of being members of the senior classes; but when the examinations take place, the honor and credit of the University, as well as of its professors, compels a weeding out of unworthy members. Only about one-third, we believe, of those offering themselves for graduation, receive diplomas. The disappointed must try another year. The great number of the latter must doubtless arise from the poor state of preparation for lectures on the literature and language of ancient Greece and Rome.

The Southern mind matures early. Boys associate earlier and more freely with men. Mathematics makes little impression on the bare memory, but addresses itself directly to the judgment. When the judgment is convinced in regard to a proposition, the memory is seldom treacherous. The difficulty of the study consists, not in the memory of many little facts, but in the ability to comprehend a few great ones, and to follow out the sequence of dependencies connecting them with other truths.

This is the study that best suits Southern youth, and that for which they display most aptitude. They have an aversion to

drudgery, but do not dislike meditative employment. The University of Virginia is the best of the Southern schools of learning; and in its requirements for its highest honors has a loftier standard than any University of the United States. A Master of Arts must not only have graduated in the schools of Ancient Languages, Modern Languages, Mathematics, Moral Philosophy, Natural Philosophy, and Chemistry, but he must submit to an examination for the purpose of showing that he retains a general grasp of all these subjects. Those who have passed this ordeal are men of learning, and many such are now engaged in the management of classical and mathematical schools, preparatory to the University.

The Universities of Alabama and Mississippi are still in embryo; they have some professors of eminence, but their different schools are not yet organized. North and South Carolina have their colleges, and Virginia has seven colleges, of different grades, inferior to her University. All of these have to contend with the prevailing indolence and domestic indulgence, which causes forbid a high standard either for admission or graduation. With a few distinguished exceptions, we maintain the grade of education at the South to be low; and that it is only so, because of the paralyzing influences of slavery.

The Professions.—The facility for admission to the practice of *Law* in the South, arises, we think, from the absolute necessity of allowing opportunity to the numbers of young men who rush into that profession, induced, partly, by its respectability, partly by the seeming verdict of the community, that the law shall be the only road to political fame. The courts can very easily defend themselves from the evil consequences of requiring but a nominal examination from candidates for the bar.

The briefless barrister, however, has another string to his bow. Public speaking is an accomplishment much cultivated at the South, and one for which, by situation and temperament, the Southron is well adapted. Once in each month, in addition to the higher courts, there is a county court. The court day corresponds in importance to the English "market day." On that day all the avenues to the county-seat are crowded with a pro-

cession as motley as that of Chaucer's Pilgrims. It is a day of conference and settlement of accounts, of bargain and sale, of political speechifying and political scheming.

The universal male population is here; those who have business and those who have none; the country gentleman to talk of crops and agricultural societies; the overseer to transact some real or pretended business connected with his charge; the coatless tenant of the log cabin trudging on foot to recreate himself with the entertainment of hearing stump speeches, and the aspiring young politician who furnishes that rich intellectual fare. Here the young lawyer, who has been some years, perhaps, sucking his fingers in lack of briefs, wins from the admiration of gaping "lieges" their suffrages for a seat in the State legislature — that fulcrum of political aspirations.

This is the school in which the Southern rustic studies — not books, but men and measures; and as "iron sharpeneth iron," so does he, by communion with men of education and experience in political life, sharpen that intelligence which is to direct his suffrage. On this arena meet the extremes of ignorance and refinement. He who belongs to the unlettered thousands inhales living wisdom — lessons never to be forgotten, from the lips of the retired statesman or diplomatist, as well as from more active strugglers in the great political contest.

The son of the middling farmer and the successful mechanic aspire to the professions. There is no willingness to swell the numbers of those engaging in mechanical crafts; both because in a slave community handicrafts are less respected, and because, from the competition of slave labor even in that field, they are less profitable. All professions are on this account crowded at the South to excess. Those young lawyers who cannot succeed, either at the bar or as politicians, generally emigrate to other fields, where the paucity of eminent talents compels them to be satisfied with inferior. All this waste steam expands itself in the new States and the territories, where a portion is reconducted, and made capable of useful effort.

Southern lawyers may be said to enter this profession in an inferior state of preparation; their law learning is acquired in

the school of practice. Apart from the swarm of pretenders, there are many more men of real eminence and profound legal attainments. There is a good school of law with two professors at the University of Virginia; graduates in this school are well qualified to enter on legal practice.

The principle of election of all officers, including "judges," by the people, is of too recent adoption to authorize a full opinion as to its propriety. As it has no necessary connection with slavery, we shall not here discuss it.

Medicine.—In this profession in the South, there has heretofore been not only, as there even now is, a want of proper classical knowledge to constitute the basis of medical study, but there has been an epidemic, now happily arrested — the prevalence of empiricism. The quackery of Thompsonianism could never have found a home in an educated community. Ignorance and dangerous pretension were too unmistakably impressed upon it to bear the scrutiny of respectably educated examiners. The light of knowledge has happily dispelled that illusion. The more imposing one, if one it be, of homœopathy, has here made little progress. Homœopathy has at least the advantage, by its *far niente* principles, of allowing nature to fight her own battles.

In the various branches of medical study — Anatomy, Surgery, Therapeutics, Materia Medica, and Chemistry, it has been the practice, as in other sciences, to use a Greek and Latin nomenclature; those languages being the common ground on which students of all countries could meet and compare opinion and detail facts. To possess this advantage, classical study is more necessary to the medical student than to the student of law. Yet the worst educated of professional students in the South are those of medicine. Being ill taught in classes, the terms of science are to them so many hard tasks for memory; they might as well be in Hebrew or Choctaw, as in Greek and Latin. To them they are, as Locke expresses it, only "articulated air." They are as fatal to them, should they attempt to use them, as were the arms of Achilles to Patroclus. They cannot keep pace with the medical periodical literature, which

announces everything new in the science, and they take refuge in traditionary routine practice. In this sphere they are, no doubt, useful; but either medicine is a jargon of words, or their usefulness would be greatly increased by a little more knowledge. Country practice admits but little scrutiny into the ignorance of physicians. He who can maintain himself in practice for twenty years, becomes, of necessity, the Galen of his neighborhood. We have often been astonished at the feeble bodily presence, and still feebler one of mind and education, of the leech whose high sounding reputation had preceded him in our acquaintance. Young doctors, as well as young lawyers, swarm in the South. Both are often compelled to a change, either in their vocations or their theatres of action.

Another profession has dawned on the horizon of civilization within the last fourth of a century — that of Civil Engineer.

It is a calling which happily does not demand for such works as are executed in America the very highest scientific attainments. Bold, practical views and some scientific pretensions are the characteristic of American engineers. Of such men, the South has furnished her share; and for many reasons, it is a profession suited to Southern character.

When removed from the unfavorable influences of slavery, Southern men exhibit an energy inferior to none; and in no calling has that fact been better proven than in the success of her engineers, and the patient toil of the young men who have embraced this new profession. With his level or his transit on his shoulder, in tedious explorations through the most forbidding and inhospitable regions, in the stout endurance of heat and cold, thirst, hunger, and rude quarters, the Southern engineer has challenged the prize of hardihood with those of rougher nurturance. Their example shows very well of what toils white men are capable in Southern climes. No corn field slave out. toils an engineer.

Unfortunately, however, the distaste for more ignoble employments, and the seductive éclat of this one, occasions a demand for places far beyond the possible supply. Many unsuccessful young lawyers and doctors, and many young men

architecture in general displays a most deplorable want of skill. Twenty-five years since, most houses in Richmond were without gutters and cornices. Great improvements in both public and domestic architecture have taken place there, though even in some of the finest buildings, the brick-work is of the most inferior kind. A mechanic class has arisen in Richmond, who have not adopted Southern habits. They have given an impulse to arts and trades in that city. House joinery in rural districts is of the coarsest kind; doors that will not shut, and windows that will not open; skirtings and wainscots that admit the air, and roofs which will not exclude the water.

Every product of mechanic art, from the smallest to the greatest, must be charged with the heavy per centage which arises from the maintenance of the "useless mouths."

Where white men are too proud to labor at ignoble trades, and slaves cannot be endued with the requisite skill, a country must be supplied with manufactured articles by importation. Apart from articles of European manufacture — the results of mature civilization and teeming population — the South allows itself to be dependent on the North for every article that requires industry and skill combined. They exchange for them agricultural products, for which slave labor is best suited. Nothing in their situation but slavery prevents their being independent of the North. Their country is richer in soil and minerals, abounding in water power, and possessing, in the regions best adapted to manufactures, the most salubrious climate.

The most primitive of arts, agriculture, thrives best; but, as we have before hinted, it either consumes its own products, directly, or their surplus is exchanged for articles of luxury, instead of being invested in savings.

We reach, then, the same conclusion in regard to arts and trades as to professions. They are equally under the blighting influence of slavery.

There is no compensation for these evils. Connected with the subjects of Education and the Mechanic Arts are

The Fine Arts.—We propose to show how slavery, in con-

nection with the changes effected by our present institutions, has operated to lower the standard of taste in the Fine Arts below that which existed in the days of colonial dependence.

Before the subdivision of the large estates of the South, most proprietors maintained the state of English gentry. Their ample means were expended in equipages, wines, costly dress, and pictures. Whether the artists who adorned the family galleries were imported, or the best pictures were painted abroad, we can no more than conjecture.

From the number of good family portraits of a date anterior to the Revolution, it will be discovered, perhaps, by the curious, that artists of some eminence must, sometimes, have visited the colonies. Youth of both sexes were often educated abroad, and brought home a taste for the refinements of art. They could speak of paintings and statuary as things they had seen, of which they had at least a better idea than that derived from an engraving, or an ill-written description; for there were not then, any more than at present, the fostering influences of large towns, the universal cradles of the arts and of all useful enterprise.

The impoverished condition of the country after the Revolution, must have given a check to indulgence in luxurious tastes, generally, but especially, we incline to think, in the knowledge and appreciation of what was even respectable in the art of painting.

Travelling artists, but of inferior skill, kept up the supply of family canvas, which was one of the traditionary wants of every genteel family. No longer able, from education and familiarity with European works of art, to discriminate between what was artistical and what was paltry, they disfigured their dwellings by pictorial abortions, which would long since have faded into oblivious darkness, such ignorance did the artists betray of the chemistry of colors, but for their happy innocence of any other knowledge of effect than that produced by sharp opposition of light and shade. To this accident we are indebted for the preservation of their outlines, which, like Scott's description of Melrose Abbey by moonlight, "seem framed of ebon and ivory."

If productions which scarcely resemble the genus may be representatives of the species, we may be allowed to conjecture what manner of men and women our Southern revolutionary grandsires and grandames might have been. By the aid of an active imagination, like that of a child, which converts a hickory stick into a prancing steed, we may metamorphose these wooden rigidities into creatures of flesh, and suppose it possible that life's warm current once animated those complexions of charcoal and tallow.

The matter of fact observer would perhaps conclude that a great improvement in the race, as to comeliness, was visible in the descendants of either sex.

These, unfortunately, are the only galleries of art accessible to the self-educating artist of the South. Agriculture, the sole pursuit, forbids the growth of towns or cities, which present, in general, collections of pictures or statuary, or associations of artists or amateurs.

No schools of design, no collections exist at the South. In the very nature of things, where there is no Athens there can be no Pericles to patronize, no Phidias to dignify a country's architecture, or commemorate its sons in marble, nor an Apelles with magic pencil to perpetuate their living selves or the splendor of their deeds.

A country devoted entirely to the tillage of the soil, and by any cause rendered unfavorable to the creation of cities, may ever want a taste for art.

There was once in Richmond a saloon of antiques. We remember in that collection an Apollo, a Medicean Venus, a Borghese Gladiator, and a Laocoön. Some evidence of the utter want of taste for the fine arts may be found in the fact, that these priceless types of ancient art have disappeared, and in vain does some devotee to the sublime art of sculpture inquire, "whither?"

We might suppose that some rapacious Verres, almost compensating for the vice of avarice by an appreciation of the beautiful, "*quod pulcherrimum fecit abstulerat*," had secretly, in the dearth of taste elsewhere, appropriated these master-pieces to the decoration of his own abode.

This would have been our own solution of the mysterious abstraction of these valuable models for the student of design, were it not that one of our civic rambles brought us suddenly in amazed and sorrowing contact with the noblest of them all, the Laocoön, defaced, mutilated, and weather-stained, in the yard of the medical college, side by side with the huge bone of a fossil mastodon, as little regarded and certainly less comprehended than the mighty relic of the greater master, whose hand formed the one and whose inspiration dictated the other.

The South has produced some artists; but all who have reached any measure of reputation have been compelled to prosecute their studies in a less sterile field, as well as to find elsewhere a market for their talents. The few specimens of the plastic art, which by legislative munificence have decorated Southern halls or grounds, have been produced by sons of other climes. Capellano, Causici, Houdon and Persico were foreign, as their names import. Powers, Greenough and Crawford were not from the South. We hear of one or two Southern artists in the schools of Italy, but their works have not yet reached us.

The want of schools of design and of artists is manifested in the paltry estimate placed by southern schools on the accomplishment of drawing. We have known, in a seminary of high grade, "Ornamental Hair Work" rated higher in the scale of remuneration than "Drawing and Painting." This in part, perhaps, arose from the fact that the "hair work" was in reality an art, while the other was but a pretension. The instruction at the South is mostly of the "Twelve Lessons" description. Theorem painting, which bears the same relation to true art as grinding the barrel organ does to music, is one of the accomplishments of Southern seminaries, the very professors of that mysterious branch being themselves in blissful ignorance of any higher style of art. If any natural taste for design — which is not uncommon here — should chance to escape the smothering shades of national indolence, the poor little flower strives in vain to lift its stem; it must be transplanted to a more genial soil or perish for lack of nutriment.

The noble art of Architecture, until within a few years, has been but a carpenter's or a bricklayer's caricature of classic or mediæval forms. Even at present, when a freer communication with the world of art elsewhere, has demonstrated the need of better architecture at home, and our architect is employed to furnish designs, they are marred or ruined in the execution by the ignorance, obstinacy, and incongruous fancies of "building committees" and "builders."

We know of one very costly church with a composite portico, an Egyptian belfry, and a pseudo-Gothic spire.

We know of another whose Grecian Doric front is surmounted by an obelisk which rivals Babel's tower.

An anomalous piece of architecture, resembling a small light house or a sentry box, crowns a third edifice whose imposing front recalls the Parthenon.

A design for a Norman church is spoiled in one place by an economy of bricks and mortar which denies an elevation of the body of the building in proportion to its spire, the latter marking by its style the period of transition to the early English.

Another Norman church, in another place, is placed on stilts, and the entrance effected as it were on the second floor, by the necessity for a basement room beneath the church; this queer substructure being as much a matter of astonishment to the spectator as the fanciful cornutings in the three designs first described.

All these things, however, bad as they are, evince a wish to do something in the way of architecture, though the ignorance and bad workmanship which mar the work are the only things of native growth. As we are not writing a work on architecture we shall be contented with saying that most of the brickwork is execrable, being the work of slaves under the direction often of men without mechanical intelligence. A small rough brick church in Richmond stuccoed, to conceal, we suppose, its defects, cost \$30,000, that being three-fourths of the cost of the Church of the Puritans in Union Square, New York, which is 104 feet long, and built of white marble. The architecture of store fronts, private dwellings, suburban edifices and villas, has taken a great stride within fifteen years; but, as might be ex-

pected in a country where productive labor and mechanical skill are scarce, architecture as well as other things must be taxed with the maintenance of the idle.

Internal Improvements.

Georgia has placed herself in the fore front of Southern States, by judicious public improvements. Her agriculture, her commerce, her manufactures, and, as a consequence, her influence in the confederacy, have all been advanced by her public improvements. Tennessee and the Carolinas have begun and partly completed vast schemes of the same kind. Alabama, Mississippi and Kentucky are yet but commencing their works. The extreme Southern States are possessed of capital to execute the schemes already begun and in progress, but the States of Kentucky and Virginia are still without productive improvements, though they have expended large sums for such objects. Physical obstacles are great in both of those States; and sectional divisions have occasioned expenditures on many small projects of no profit, which make a large aggregate of cost. Few completed lines exist to pay the cost of construction.

Virginia has a debt of sixteen or eighteen millions, and an empty treasury. The country is rich in land and rural labor, but not in the capital to make railroads and canals.

The legal rate of interest is six per cent. A higher rate of interest would perhaps enable the State to borrow capital, to finish her works and make them productive; but, here too, agriculture interposes, and says to capital, "what suits your interest is adverse to mine." A higher rate of interest, which would increase the value of money, must diminish the exchangeable value of all which money procures; hence, as the rate of interest rises agricultural produce falls in value. The power of the agricultural interest in the struggle with capital was displayed in the failure of an attempt to make seven per cent. the legal rate of interest. The main agriculture of Virginia is east of the mountains, and has already an access of some sort to market. West of the mountains their agriculture and their mines are yet undeveloped. Their interests would be subserved by any

course which would give them improvements; but they are in the minority. They have few or no slaves, yet their interests are made to succumb to that of a slaveholding section. In those Southern States where the rate of interest is higher, capital is more abundant, and more extensive improvements have been executed.

Southern legislatures are composed of very young men. The Nestors of the South have been shouldered aside to make room for aspiring young politicians. The South has always produced and still possesses eminent men, but they are not generally in public life.

Legislative assemblies are made up of lawyers of the political stamp, some farmers and planters, ex-sheriffs and store-keepers. There is necessarily much political legislation where professed politicians lead, but too little of that kind which conduces to a nation's wealth. Youths green from college, who ought to be astonished at finding themselves members of deliberative bodies at all, engage in fierce digladiation, or gravely enlighten their seniors in matters of political economy or finance.

This evil springs from slavery.

What has been the wisdom of legislatures so composed, may be inferred from the fiscal condition of Southern States. It is our opinion that if young men were employed in the many useful callings which require action and energy more than counsel, and men of mature age were sent to represent the people, a wholesome change would at once occur in legislation.

Amusements.

Visiting, as might be expected among a people of leisure, is more customary than in industrious communities. The interchange of hospitalities in Southern neighborhoods has no parallel in other portions of the States. Hospitality is unostentatious and sincere. It is remarkable mostly in the country, where a transient guest is always pressed to prolong his stay.

The amusements of men, as is generally the case in indolent countries, are of an exciting kind. Horse racing, shooting and cards afford the stimulus to rouse those energies which ought to find more useful employment.

Gaming is the prevalent vice. It is not practised openly, as in former fashionable society, but now acknowledges its baseness by avoidance of the light. Many members of the legislature spend much time at faro tables.

At these resorts are formed acquaintances which make the connecting link between the blackleg and the gentleman. They are sometimes men of estate and family, whose time is occupied with racing, betting and cards. These family connections and position give them access to the best society, while they are hand and glove with every *chevalier d'industrie* that frequents their favorite hells. From this cause, in the South, the odious epithet of "gambler," has been softened into that of "Mr. Such-an-one, the sportsman."

At the gaming table and the race course occur all those fatal rencounters, with knife and pistol, which distinguish the South. The *habitué* of those places always wears bowie-knife and revolver.

These are some of the pleasant fruits of having too little to do.

In town, a favorite amusement also resulting from that same lack of occupation is one of more classic authority. As the old Athenians spent much of their time in the "agora," seeking for something new, so on every fair day may be discerned, at sundry favorite corners, groups sunning themselves, and earnestly discussing the unfailing theme — politics, or engaged in the serious employment of discovering into what possible variety of fanciful and useless shapes a sharp knife can transform a piece of soft wood, during its progress, from the size of a walking-stick to that of a tooth-pick.

The monotony of these employments is sometimes varied by a game at "marbles," between adult contestants, the bystanders generally evincing great interest in the vicissitudes of chance or the exhibition of skill.

A good way of killing time in the country, is found to be an occasional "barbecue." At this entertainment, one party contributes the solids, and a second the drinkables, which do not generally conform to the canons of the "temperance society."

Pitching quoits, or dollars, or quarter racing follows; and the amusement frequently terminates in a fight between some parties who do not know what they are fighting about, and are the next day totally oblivious of the occurrence. It is but just to say that no permanent feuds or sanguinary conflicts arise from this favorite amusement.

Polite entertainments at the South in which ladies mingle, are as refined and unexceptionable as in the most favored countries, where elegant courtesy and strict propriety are the characteristics of society.

The tendency of Southern politics is democratic, from the disposition to level, not downwards, but *upwards*, to which we have before alluded. All proprietors are of one class; and those who have no property, the needy poor, though their interests are manifestly opposed by slavery, are still so dependent for their little modicum of employment, on the proprietary class, that they are seen upholding the interests of slavery with their suffrages as earnestly as feudal lords.

They are too few and too dependent to form a party in support of their own interests. Any measures for the amelioration of the slave's condition must be the voluntary act of the slaveholder. The time has not yet come for white labor to assert its interests by representation in the halls of legislation.

Influence on Religion.

Rural districts, whether pastoral or agricultural, are favorable to the growth of religion. This is very observable in the South. The motives which collect the population of a Christian country in the Sabbath sanctuary, be they what they may, must result in the promotion of piety. The young may assemble, perhaps, with purposes of recreation; but the habit of attending divine service is formed, and this habit is made the instrument for the infusion into Southern character of almost universal respect for religion, and of much religious sentiment. We do not recollect seeing a census of church members in the Southern States, but we should be surprised if it should not be found that among the white population, the proportion ex-

ceeds that in free States, where large cities foster a vicious and corrupt population, and present so many more inducements to disregard Sabbaths and Sabbath ordinances.

With this prevalent religious sentiment was once mingled a humane commiseration for the poor slaves, on whose toils the mass of the community subsisted. The evils of slavery, in reference to the whites, at least, were acknowledged, and in Maryland, Virginia, and Kentucky, the public mind was much aroused to the consideration of some plan for the dissolution of the unnatural tie. It has been asserted by a Southern divine, (Mr. Ross, of Alabama,) that the slavery agitation at the North had been productive of good. It has prevented, he asserts, a premature abolition of slavery here, which would have been as fatal in its consequences as was abolition in the British island of Jamaica.

This opinion may be allowed to possess force; but it seems to us to be only tenable, on the ground of effort to hasten the time when both master and slave shall be better for that event. In a late letter on this subject, which is measurably a reflection of the Calhoun heresy, that "slavery is a blessing," Mr. Ross launches the sharpest invective against the false philanthropist of the North, who subsists and possibly grows rich on the products of slave labor — rice, sugar, cotton, tobacco, &c. The reverend writer indulges in a somewhat unbecoming parody of the Savior's denunciation of the hypocrisy of the Scribes and Pharisees, in the 23d of Matthew. Our own opinion is, that it is a much more sinful hypocrisy to endeavor to defend modern slavery by the abuse of God's word. Let us examine, however, the justice of that charge. Suppose the rest of the world were to refuse to consume the products of slave labor, would not Mr. Ross at once assail the fanaticism which, in the endeavor to starve slaveholders into measures, should include slaves in the same punishment? All the men of the North, moreover, who consume the products of slave labor, are not Abolitionists of the ultra school. Many of them are men who, whilst they consider emancipation to be a Christian duty on the part of slaveholders, think that the latter, in

their familiarity with the subject, are the best judges of the time and manner for the accomplishment of that object. They would probably suppose that the very worst way to prepare the slave for a state of freedom would be to discourage his industry.

Mr. Ross's letter chaunts "*Io pæan*" in honor of "king cotton," maintaining him to be paramount to British diplomacy and Northern commerce. As for us, we do not believe in earthly kings. We believe God reigns, and that he will not permit the necessity for cotton fabrics to perpetuate the institution of slavery. We are informed by Sir E. Bulwer Lytton, that "the Saxon church invariably set the example of freeing the theow, (personal slave,) and emancipating the ceorl, (the serf of the soil,) and taught that such acts were to the salvation of the soul." Eight hundred years ago, then, it had not been discovered by the Christian church that "slavery is a blessing;" that precious discovery was reserved for the wisdom and piety of the nineteenth century, and for the land above all others which had assumed to itself the championship of freedom in sight of the whole world! Twenty years since, this new truth in ethics had not insinuated itself into the most acute of Southern minds, though now as clear to some of them as the sun's meridian splendor. Even yet the stupid European, the stupid native of Northern States, cannot conceive the stupendous problem. It requires an anointing of the eyes with the sight of cotton fields in hoary harvest, or of gains somehow derived from others' toil and sweat, to penetrate it. But all Southern consciences are not so obtuse; all are not willing, for the sake of cankered gold and silver, "to heap together treasure for the last days."

Though habit has in some degree weakened the disgust which slavery generally inspires in the neophyte, and though an entirely satisfactory plan of manumission has not been devised, there still exists in every unperverted Southern heart, a gnawing conviction that humanity, justice, religion, require more to be done to enlighten and Christianize the slaves. Speak not of their outward comfort! They are whited sepulchres, full of dead men's bones and all uncleanness. If the Southern clergy

allow their minds to be led astray on this question, fearful will be their account! On them, we think, mainly depends the future of the slave. Either humane legislation, through the influence of education, must raise him to the level of humanity, and the possible hope of salvation, or his chains will become adamant, and by the power of conscience this confederacy be rent in twain. The higher law cannot be asserted in opposition to the Constitution, without a revocation of the compact which binds the States; but all must acknowledge that there is such a law, more binding on conscience than the edicts of kings or congresses, than constitutions or human enactments.

Let all who love their country deprecate a resort to it. Not from any apprehensions for the peace of the country, for we cannot believe a separation of the States must be attended with bloodshed; but for the cause of suffering humanity and the nation's greatness, strengthened and cemented as it has been by union, we should deplore disruption, especially for such cause.

In the foregoing disquisition, we undertook to show the causes which have produced, in two scions from a common stock, plants of a character so different as the Southerner and the man of the North, as well as the injurious influence of slavery on Southern institutions and character. The latter proposition we have disposed of as well as our limits would admit. Volumes, based upon statistics which cannot be disputed, might be written in confirmation of our views.

Our chief object is that of securing on the part of each section more tolerance towards the other; we therefore will conclude our remarks on the distinctions between the sections by a parallel illustrative of our opinion that either section, under an exchange of position, would be what the other now is.

The Southerner is polite, generous, hospitable; rather grave, though fond of pleasure; indolent and improvident from habit, but capable, under the influence of pride or emulation, of even continued industry. He is unused to discourtesy or rude contradiction, and resents such aggressions with more than nec-

essary heat. He dresses well without being a fop; is fond of society, and deferential, even beyond Americans in general, to the weaker sex.

The Northerner, even though educated, is discriminating in his courtesies; less lavish and hospitable than the Southerner; more cheerful in manners, and in the lower classes boisterous; punctual, frugal and industrious, from necessity first, and afterwards from habit; indulging in pleasure only as a recreation. The necessary intercourse of jarring classes, in an active community, makes all less sensitive to rude accost, which is by no means uncommon, but which is not unduly resented. Northerners of all classes are more devoted to display in houses, equipages and dress. Deference to females is less a national trait.

For these variations in character we will now endeavor to account.

The almost universal courtesy of the South, as we have elsewhere explained, arises from the fact that but one distinction is acknowledged — that of the free and the slave. Any rudeness from the latter class to the former is, in the nature of things, impossible; consequently the upper classes are not contaminated by the necessity of repelling vulgar aggression. On the contrary, the bearing of the gentleman is imitated by the poorer white and even by the negro; more successfully often by the latter than the former.

In the crowded North, on the contrary, such catholic urbanity would be worse than wasted. Society is there in a social ferment, the scum striving to be uppermost. Distinctions, except political ones, are necessary. Diversity of employment, education, habits, even of nativity, forbid any comfortable general association. The different classes, trades, or nations of immigrants best satisfy their own tastes and pursue their happiness by separating into circles, where they are attracted by community of interest, feeling, and themes of conversation. The only intercourse between these varied elements, is that of business. The masses meet and pass each other as strangers. Each grade in this heterogeneous system,

in the acknowledged possession of political equality, is endeavoring to assert equality in social position, or ready at least to do so on slight provocation. The wealthy or educated are compelled to practice in self-defence great reserve towards the less favored of fortune. This at first may be difficult to the kind hearted, but by constant habit becomes easy; it nevertheless, to those who have not considered its necessity, has the appearance of arrogance.

The Southerner, whose daily bread is not derived from daily gains, who makes no present sacrifice for such objects, is not withheld in his generous impulses by the iron hand of necessity. Hospitality in sparsely peopled rural districts, is not more an accommodation to the guest than a recreation to the entertainer. It is one of the pleasures of the Southern planter or farmer, which he prefers to fine furniture or an elegant dwelling.

In the North the number of those who could possibly practice hospitality is small. The class of country gentlemen scarcely exists at all. The proprietors of country seats entertain their city friends for the few months in the summer which they can spare from business. In their absence, nine months or more in the year, the neighborhood is a social wilderness. Everybody is too busy to visit or to entertain; and though neighborly kindness and civility are abundant, their pleasures are mostly confined to their own firesides. It cannot well be otherwise there. Every man's means are measured. Cash payments require that there shall be no superabundant provision which shall supply frequent and desultory calls on hospitality; no facile credit opens the door to waste, where the consumption of every mouth is counted. In a population so dense as that of Northern States, the hope, too, to those of hospitable turn, is not so great "of entertaining angels unawares," as the risk of entertaining those of very opposite character.

And now to compare these opposite conditions in their fruits, we may say that, if on the one hand the practice of close economy may degenerate into parsimony, it also enables him

who practises it to be just as well as generous; while uncalculating expenditure, even with the fairest intention, though it may breed an open-handed generosity of feeling, is liable to the countervailing charge of disregard to the claims of suffering creditors, to say nothing of the ruin in which it must sooner or later involve an otherwise happy home. There is no true generosity without some sacrifice. The poor man who shares his loaf and jug of milk with the wayfarer, is more generous than the great who entertain to gratify their own pride or love of amusement, and who do not feel their own comforts one whit abridged.

The gravity of Southern character is not that of temperament, but that of habit—the habit of authority. It seems to be a common trait, for that reason, wherever slavery prevails. To the shallow observer it is the attribute of a superior intellectuality, until a closer scrutiny shows this trait to exist in the clod-hopping, tobacco-chewing overseer, who cannot write his name, as well as in the proprietor, the judge, or the *literateur*.

In the North, "*tout le monde fait son naturel*," and a very coarse "*naturel*" it sometimes must perforce be, where men of all climes, trades, tastes, pursuits, and characters congregate, and where all are free to follow any impulse within the liberty of reason. In such a Babel, where the coarse beer-drinking German, the fighting Irishman, the volatile Frenchman, and the superstitious or atheistical of those and other nations are mingled with our own population, all endeavoring to insinuate their own pleasures, follies, or political heresies into the staid fabric of our home institutions, it is gratifying to see, and even prejudice must confess it, that all that is great, good, noble, and truly refined, is of Anglo-Saxon origin and growth, the common property of Americans, North and South.

The indolence of Southern character is the natural result of being waited upon, as the industry of Northerners is the effect of necessity. Each of them is capable of a change of character. Transplanted to the busy theatres of Northern

industry, the Southerner learns activity, thrift, and self-reliance. The Northerner removed to Southern climes will not be apt to retain those virtues when they no longer constitute a necessary capital for his success in enterprise. Success often transforms his character and habits. He learns to like profuse attendance, and possibly becomes an advocate of slavery. We have ourselves witnessed a debate in the city of New York, where a Northern denizen of the South upheld the cause of slavery, in opposition to a Southerner whose Northern residence had made him favorable to emancipation.

The habitual courtesy of the Southerner and the deference paid to him as a proprietor, the habit of authority, and the very infrequency of the things themselves, make him sharply resentful of disrespect or contradiction. The habit of wearing concealed arms is increasing, and bloody rencounters are gradually creeping Northward. Their natural boundary is that of slavery. That institution not only begets the temper that prompts to such actions, but furnishes the leisure for loose amusements or idle occupations in which they take place. People are too busy in the North for such recreations. Were every quarrel there accompanied, as in the South, by resort to bowie knives or pistols, the streets of their cities would resemble fields of battle. Like our English ancestors, disputants there confine themselves to a few angry words, or the low bred to blows.

In countries where slavery does not exist, manhood does not require every insult to be washed out with blood; and the man of inferior degree has satisfied all demands on his reputation, even for spirit, when he has resisted a brute of superior strength with his best ability, and if an unprovoked attack should have been made on him, should afterwards resort to law. In the South, where every white man claims the privilege of the gentleman, such an injury requires a bloody atonement.

The law of the world inculcates spirit; the law of Christ humility. If the beginning of strife were more avoided, how much misery and suffering would be spared!

Northern opulence displays itself in fine edifices, in expens-

ive carriages, and subservience to fashions in dress. Wealth asserts its claims to notice in the evidence it gives of its existence; and in the equality of condition which prevails at the North, and the dependence of the inferior on the wealthier classes, it is not to be wondered at that wealth should seem to be more valued.

The Southern gentleman often lives in a very plain dwelling; and notwithstanding his numerous servants, his establishment is wanting in what elsewhere would be considered ordinary comforts. Every one in the South keeps a carriage. Few carriages are remarkable for style or ostentation. Fine furniture is still scarcer among people of real refinement in rural districts of the South, than among the plain farmers of the North. In short, money at the South is not so much the gauge of respectability, and position is not so much sought by ostentation in equipage and dress. Southern gentlemen, especially, are seldom guilty of what Thackeray denominates "loud dressing." The gambler is the only exception. Superior ideas of chivalry are claimed for the South. It is a pity that the very name has not passed away with the age and the state of society which gave it birth.

We do not pretend to have read all that has been written by Mills Scott and others on that subject, but every reader of history is acquainted with its general features.

When Europe was divided into petty kingdoms and principalities; and sovereign as well as individual rights were won and maintained at the sword's point, when no law existed but that of the stronger; and iron-shod oppression trampled human rights in the dust, where pride, cruelty, and the reckless lust of power, desolated the domestic hearth and disfigured the fair face of nature with carnage and ruin — the rise of chivalry which illumined the dark abysses of crime and ignorance with a few brilliant examples of justice and generosity, was a blessing to society. In the absence of laws for the protection of the feeble, they sought redress by the display of their wrongs to one more powerful or more generous than the oppressor. In this way great wrongs were sometimes righted, and the

march of spoil and injustice arrested; but often oppression itself assumed the garb of justice, and quite as often were appeals to the lance, the axe, and the sword, decided adversely to the right.

The old trial by battle was but a silly tempting of Providence, in most of the cases in which resort to it was made. Such is the verdict of a more enlightened age.

The modern duel, the illegitimate descendant of this mode of testing right, has none of its apologies. The trivial punctilios on which modern appeals to arms are often made, are unworthy the serious consideration of a reflecting being; still less do they require the peril of human life.

Modern chivalry retains nothing of its paternity, except its baser features. The one was self-sacrificing, modest, courteous; and in its highest form, "*sans reproche*," as well as "*sans peur*." The chivalry of our time is self-seeking, arrogant, boastful, and is more frequently the property of the ill-bred and vicious than of the man of education and breeding.

That of the middle ages professed the sway of Christianity. Our modern chivalry ignores or despises it.

Courtesy formerly required that there should be no undue haste in imputing wrong; and fairness and generosity, when a bloody arbitrament became necessary, scorned the advantage of unequal weapons. The modern code of honor makes quickness to take offence an evidence of spirit, and allows offensive speech to be requited with the unexpected shot or stab. In reference to this question, however, as St. Paul says, "we speak but as a man." The sudden brawl, the street rencounter, and the more courtly duel, are all opposed to the spirit of Christianity; all are adverse to the law of neighborly charity, and are based upon the most reckless self-seeking, determined to assert the possession of what is miscalled spirit, though the consequences to the other party may be a suffering or modification in nowise proportioned to the offence.

The only good feature of ancient chivalry sustained by us is courtesy of deportment to females. In this, the South is preëminent. The cause of this we take to be in part the fact,

that the carriage of high-born dames and cavaliers in slave States was not tarnished in its lustre, for a long period, by contact with the "ignoble vulgar." There is even now too slight a prevalence of vulgar influences to debase the temper of the high social courtesy which they have inherited from their ancestors. Far be it from us to claim for the South superiority in sterling virtue; we only contend for the wider prevalence of external courtesy, and in particular that due to females.

Another reason for this more reverential manner to the sex, is the contrast they present to the poor degraded daughters of Africa, whose sad condition we have already with pain revealed; the impurity of female slaves being both a foil and a safeguard to the honor of their mistresses.

In free society, the vulgar class, whose vices resemble those of Southern slaves, are undistinguished by color, and very often by dress or deportment, from the refined and virtuous. Among so dense a population, composed of the most opposite elements, dress and demeanor cannot become safe passports; in society one must be known to be the recipient of courtesy or hospitality. Though courtesy may cost no more to the professor than the expenditure of his light and heat may cost the sun, he must still look — if not for its reflection from some orb of congenial brightness — at least for some sensibility to its genial influence. Universal politeness, except of the passive sort, in an omnibus or rail car, might prove even worse than pearls thrown to swine.

The fact might be conjectured, if it were not known, that in the South there is less risk in treating all with courtesy.

In the above parallel we have traced, as we think, all difference of character between the South and North to the influence of slavery. We have shown slavery to carry with its evils some compensations; as we have also shown that the physical prosperity of the free States has its unavoidable concomitants of vicious, crowded cities, and a swarming population, which require the close barriers of caste, and preclude

the free overflow of courtesy and kindness. In vain will some bigot of the South remark, "we want not the prosperity which must be accompanied by coarse vulgarity; we prefer our own institutions." Every effort, however, is constantly made to introduce Northern arts. With them must come Northern men. Commerce and manufactures will introduce a new element into Southern population. Its aristocratic tone and some of its refinement will perforce disappear. They will exchange a little outward polish of manner, for a thousand refined comforts of which Southern life is ignorant. Education may, perhaps, at some future day, give us a population possessing all the active industry and productive capacity of the North, with the superior courtesy of manner which characterizes the mass of the population of the South.

Though impending clouds now darken the political atmosphere, and harsh, discordant murmurs echo in the horizon, we cannot despair of the Republic. It cannot be one of those ephemeral political existences of which history exhibits some specimens. It took its origin from principles too exalted and too refined to bear within them the elements of decay. The rise and progress of the United States is a portion of historic record which bears too evident an impress of Divine preordination to apprehend it. God never reared so fair a fabric for no better purpose than to strike it to the ground ere the top stone be laid. Never before the present age appeared such a harbinger of a political millennium. The great events to be fulfilled in our destiny required a new theatre, which was accordingly provided, allowing unlimited expansion to the activity of human enterprise, giving freedom to the oppressed and bread to the starving, extending the boon of political and religious toleration to refugees from foreign tyrannies, where they might worship or might vote unawed by pope or council, bishop, king or despot. Fanaticism at the North first begot the sophistry which defended slavery. The growth of that false logic is fostered by persistent abuse of that institution, until it begins to assume, in the minds of the uninquiring, a character which it could not have had with its authors, that

of religious truth. The South have been urged to the brink of a precipice from which they may wildly leap if urged too far.

To the North then we would say, "hold back!" and to the South, "go not on!" And especially to the latter would we say, "consider well your own situation, and whether your own peace and prosperity, the preservation of the Union and the obligations of humanity, do not require of you so to revise your institutions and laws, as to make your slaves **partakers** of the universal progress of mankind."








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